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Mediation and Post-Election Litigation: 
A Way Forward 
REBECCA GREEN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Most who have looked at the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
in election disputes have concluded that ADR is not appropriate in the 
election context, particularly in post-election disputes. This article challenges 
that orthodoxy and suggests that ADR, specifically mediation, can play a 
useful role when elections go awry. 
As someone who teaches both ADR and Election Law, I like to point out 
to my students the natural link between these two disciplines-elections, 
after all, are a form of dispute resolution. So it seems almost cannibalistic to 
ask the question of how ADR might inform election law. Not only that, but 
as discussed in different ways at the Symposium underlying this volume, 
election disputes do not fit well with many of the theories that animate ADR 
scholarship. Elections are inherently binary. Elections are the zero-sum game 
that any admirer of Getting to Yes 1 abhors. In an election, there is no way to 
split the pie any differently, no way to "create value."2 Democracy demands 
a winner and a loser. There is nothing in elections Beyond Winning. 3 
This article explores what the ADR field can contribute to resolving 
disputes in elections based on the premise that although elections themselves 
are binary, the many disputes that can arise during the election process reveal 
a more nuanced picture. Disaggregating election disputes reveals structures 
* Professor of Practice, William & Mary Law School. Many thanks to the following 
individuals for their valuable insights and input: Minnesota Secretary of State Mark 
Ritchie, Minnesota Supreme Court Justice Paul Anderson, Jack Young, Marc Elias, Ben 
Ginsberg, Gary Poser, and Lynn Fraser. Thanks also to Carrie Menkel-Meadow and 
Howard Bellman for their suggestions and encouragement. And finally, thanks to John 
Mulligan, Shanna Reulbach, and Megan Mitchell for their very able research support. 
I ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETIING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GrviNG IN (Bruce ed., 1991). 
2 Although some have suggested there are ways to split the pie even in elections. See 
Lawrence Susskind, Could Florida Election Dispute Have Been Mediated?, DISP. RESOL. 
MAG., Winter 2002, at 8, 10 (including the bold idea that Gore and Bush, through a 
mediated agreement, might have (1) agreed to give the other input in Supreme Court 
appointments, cabinet posts, and (2) agreed to install bipartisan task forces to develop 
proposals on key policy issues). 
3 ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE 
IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000). 
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that ADR scholars and practitioners deal with every day: multiple parties of 
interest, strong fervor, high emotion, a focus on positions rather than 
interests, and a need to define a process that will produce a result that all 
sides will abide. 
By disaggregating disputes that arise in elections, I hope to show that 
there is room for value creation in election dispute resolution and that 
mediation can help resolve election disputes more efficiently. Others have 
written about mediating disputes that arise before elections,4 but common 
wisdom has advised that "parties are unlikely to ... resolve post-election 
disputes in mediation in light of the high stakes finger-pointing and the need 
to certify the election results in a timely manner."5 This article takes issue 
with that assumption, arguing that mediation could prove a useful tool to 
address shortfalls inherent in post-election litigation. 
This paper begins with a review of the current landscape with respect to 
non-judicial resolution of election disputes, underscoring general acceptance 
of the idea that court is not always the best place to resolve certain election 
disputes. The following sections review the drawbacks of both mediation and 
litigation in the post-election dispute context, concluding that both are in 
their own ways fraught. With these shortcomings in mind, the next section 
suggests that disaggregating post-election disputes into process disputes 
versus outcome-determinative disputes reveals a role for mediation. The final 
section tests this approach using the 2008 Minnesota senate recount as a case 
study. The Minnesota recount provides an opportunity to retroactively 
disaggregate post-election disputes, illustrating some of the greatest-and 
perhaps most unanticipated-challenges posed. Although mediation might 
not be right in all post-election disputes, the Minnesota example helps 
unpack instances in which mediation could usefully play a part. 
II. EXTRA-JUDICIAL PROCESSES IN ELECTION DISPUTES 
Before advancing the theory that ADR, particularly mediation, could 
improve dispute outcomes in the election context, this section reveals that 
many jurisdictions already employ extra-judicial forms of dispute resolution 
in U.S. elections. Out-of-court election dispute resolution mechanisms are in 
place at both the federal and state level. This section will discuss four distinct 
forms: statutory, administrative, legislative, and quasi-judicial. 
4 See generally Erin Butcher-Lyden, Note, The Need for Mandatory Mediation and 
Arbitration in Election Disputes, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 531 (2010) (arguing for 
the adoption of a federal statute mandating mediation in pre-election disputes). 
5 Jd. at 544. 
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ADR is featured explicitly in several state and federal statutes.6 One 
example is the Federal Election Commission (FEC) ADR Program.7 In 2000, 
the FEC established the program, which employs ADR techniques to resolve 
selected federal campaign finance disclosure disputes. While the FEC's ADR 
Program has never formally mediated a case, the program uses problem 
solving facilitative mediation techniques to settle select campaign finance 
complaints. According to program director Lynn Fraser, the use of interest-
based negotiation has greatly enhanced the efficiency with which such 
referrals are processed. 8 
The Help America Vote Act (HA VA) provides another example of an 
explicit statutory ADR requirement in elections. To be eligible for funding 
under HA VA, section 15512 requires states to incorporate ADR procedures 
to help individuals resolve specified claims involving discrimination or lack 
of access to the polls should the administrative complaint process take too 
long.9 Following HA VA's mandate, states have begun to adopt ADR 
procedures. For example, New York's Election Law section 3-105 sets out an 
administrative complaint procedure that provides a process for recourse for 
an individual who believes that there has been a violation of Title Ill of 
HA V A.Io The New York statute provides that if a panel of the State Board of 
Elections fails to resolve a formal complaint within ninety days, the 
6 For a review of some examples, see Butcher-Lyden, supra note 4, at 571-72. 
7 See ADR Program, FEC, http://www.fec.gov/em/adr.shtml (revised Feb. 20 10). 
This program tracks general federal support for the increased use of ADR, embodied in 
the enactment of the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. § 574(a), 
(b) (LexisNexis 2011) (authorizing federal agencies to use ADR in disputes, exempting 
mediation from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, and requiring agencies 
to adopt ADR policies) and the ADR Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 651 (requiring each 
federal district court to develop ADR procedures). 
8 Telephone Interview with Lynn Fraser, Director, Federal Election Commission 
ADR Program (May 25, 2011 ). For a discussion of the politics surrounding the passage 
of the ADRA, see Lawrence E. Susskind et al., When ADR Becomes the Law: A Review 
of Federal Practice, 9 NEGOTIATION J. 59 (1993). Since its passage, federal agencies 
have increasingly incorporated ADR dispute resolution techniques to curtail litigation and 
other administrative inefficiencies. See David Seibel, To Enhance the Operation of 
Government: Reauthorizing the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, I HARV. NEGOT. 
L. REv. 239 (1996). 
9 See 42 U.S.C. §15512(a)(2)(I) ("If the State fails to meet the deadline applicable 
under subparagraph (H), the complaint shall be resolved within 60 days under ADR 
procedures established for purposes of this section. The record and other materials from 
any proceedings conducted under the complaint procedures established under this section 
shall be made available for use under the ADR procedures." (emphasis added)). 
10 N.Y. ELEC. LAW§ 3-105(1) (Consol. 2011). 
327 
HeinOnline  -- 27 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 328 2012
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 27:2 2012] 
complaint can be moved to an outside ADR agency for resolution. 11 The 
agency then has an additional sixty days to resolve the dispute and make a 
final determination. 12 New York contracts with the New York State Dispute 
Resolution Association to resolve these complaints.13 While the system is in 
place, thus far no claim has been resolved through this mechanism. 14 
Although neither example reflects a robust incorporation of ADR into 
election processes, the FEC ADR Program and HA VA's ADR mandates 
mark federal recognition that ADR has a place in resolving election disputes. 
Aside from explicit statutory mention of ADR in resolving election 
disputes, the most common form of non-judicial resolution of election 
disputes is administrative. Connecticut provides an example of a state that 
routes election disputes through an administrative commission before 
proceeding to court. IS Connecticut's State Elections Enforcement 
Commission is charged with policing "[any] alleged violation . .. of any 
provision of the general statutes relating to any election or referendum [or) 
primary .... " 16 In a nod to informal dispute resolution measures, Connecticut 
statute requires that the Commission "attempt to secure voluntary 
compliance, by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion, 
with [the requirements of Connecticut election statutes]."'7 Another example 
is North Carolina, where election statutes require that those who wish to file 
an "election protest" must file with the county board of elections for 
preliminary consideration, with an appeal to the state board of elections.18 
Many other states require an administrative process before a party may 
II N.Y. ELEC. LAW§ 3-105(7) (Consol. 2011). 
12 !d. 
13 According to Bill McCann, Deputy Enforcement Counsel for the New York State 
Board of Elections, very few HA VA complaints reach the state level each year. McCann 
stated that the majority of complaints are resolved on the local level. 
14 Since the Election Law §3- 105 was enacted, the ADR provision has never been 
used. McCann says that the Legislature enacted the law to provide the Board of Elections 
with more control and flexibility to resolve disputes and address complaints (e.g., by 
providing more access to the polls), but the administrative process has not yet progressed 
to the point where the provision is necessary. McCann noted that this provision is not 
particularly useful in avoiding litigation because it addresses HA VA complaints 
specifically; HA VA provides no right to sue in itself. New York does not have an ADR 
provision for any other election law complaint process. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 3 -105 
(Consol. 2011). 
328 
15 CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 9-7a(g) (2011). 
!6 CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 9-7b(a)(l) (2011). 
!7 CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 9-7b(a)(6) (2011). 
18 N.C. GEN. STAT. §163-182.9-11 (2011). 
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litigate a post-election dispute. 19 Election law scholars analyzing the 
effectiveness of administrative remedies point to partisanship of election 
administration in most states negatively impacting the integrity of and 
public's confidence in elections as serious challenges these bodies face. 20 
No doubt in homage to the idea that courts should steer clear of political 
disputes, 21 some state statutes require state legislatures to settle certain post-
election disputes. Legislative branch involvement is typically restricted to 
elections for specified offices of distinct importance, such as govemor.22 
Akin to the power conferred on Congress by Article 1, Section 5 of the U.S. 
Constitution, which grants to Congress the power to judge the elections and 
qualifications of its members, some states similarly grant power to state 
legislatures to resolve certain election disputes. Alabama statute, for 
example, mandates that its general assembly serves as a tribunal to resolve 
disputes in elections for a wide range of offices.23 Likewise, Colorado state 
statutes charge its general assembly with resolving contests concerning 
elections of certain state officers.24 
Of states that rely on the judiciary to resolve election disputes, some 
have established alternative quasi-adjudicative procedures for certain election 
disputes. In lllinois, for example, all election disputes are fast-tracked 
19 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 17-7-5(a)(11)(2011). 
20 Daniel P. Tokaji, The Persistence of Partisan Election Administration, ELECTION 
LAW @ MORITZ (Sept. 28, 2010), 
http://moritz1aw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/index.php?ID=7645. 
21 See infra notes 65-69. 
22 KY. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 120.205 (LexisNexis 2011); 25 P.A. STAT. ANN. § 3312 
(West 2011); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 7-1-50 (2011); V.A. CODE ANN.§ 24.03-804 (2011); W. 
VA. CODE§ 3-7-2 (LexisNexis 2011). 
23 ALA. CODE § 17-16-65 (2011). "The two houses of the Legislature, in joint 
convention assembled, and presided over by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
shall constitute the tribunal for the trial of all contests for the office of Governor, 
Secretary of State, Auditor, Treasurer, Attorney General, Commissioner of Agriculture 
and Industries, justices of the Supreme Court, or judges of the courts of appeals .... " 
24 CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN §§1-11-205, 207 (West 2011). Colorado's statutory 
scheme instructs that the senate president will preside over a meeting of the general 
assembly at which testimony from the contestor will be heard, along with the contestee. 
The parties' lawyers may then offer arguments, followed by debate among the general 
assembly concluding with a vote. Steven Huefner observes that "letting majoritarian 
institutions resolve questions about the majority's will in an election contest may be 
appropriate." Steven F. Huefner, Remedying Election Wrongs, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
265, 321 (2007). For an argument advocating against state courts interfering with 
Congress' roie in U.S. Congressional elections, see Kristen R. Lisk, The Resolution of 
Contested Elections in the U.S. House of Representatives: Why State Courts Should Not 
Help with the House Work, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1213 (2008). 
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directly to the State Supreme Court.25 In Nebraska, one district court is 
designated to hear all election disputes.26 In Ohio, contests involving races 
for statewide office are heard by the Chief Justice of the State Supreme 
CourtP Some states make use of judicial panels, perhaps demonstrating a 
recognition that election disputes are both too important and too political to 
be entrusted to one judge. In Iowa, the Chief Justice of the Iowa State 
Supreme Court selects three district judges to make up a panel to hear 
disputes in statewide elections, and selects four district judges to sit with him 
or her to hear disputes regarding elections_ for national office, including 
presidential electors.28 For ballot initiatives, Iowa's resolution-by-panel-
system ventures even further from standard judicial resolution: the contesting 
party nominates one panelist, the county commissioner nominates an 
opposing panelist, and the two nominated panelists mutually agree on a third 
person, all three of whom sit together to adjudicate the dispute.29 
The range of alternatives to standard litigation indicates dissatisfaction 
among the states with traditional adjudication as the sole method of resolving 
election disputes. By allowing county and state administrative boards to 
resolve local election disputes, holding special legislative sessions, or 
convening special judicial panels, states routinely acknowledge that some 
election disputes are ill-suited, for a variety of reasons, to standard litigation. 
While litigation remains a default solution, states appear open to exploring 
alternative methods to reach more efficient and satisfying results. 
Although there has been increasing interest in the use of ADR in election 
disputes, mediation has not been promoted in the post-election context. The 
next section examines likely reasons why. 
III. THE DRAWBACKS OF MEDIATION 
IN THE POST-ELECTION CONTEXT 
Good mediators work with parties to help them understand their interests 
and generate options to meet those interests. A skilled mediator can help 
parties identify their interests even if they came to the table armed only with 
25 10 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/23-l.la (LexisNexis 2011) ("[t]he Supreme Court 
shall have jurisdiction over contests of the results of any election, including a primary, for 
an elected officer provided for in Article V of the Constitution, and shall retain 
jurisdiction throughout the course of such election contests."). 
330 
26 NEB. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 32-1102 (LexisNexis 2011). 
27 OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 35.1508(B) {LexisNexis 2011). 
28 IOWA CODE§ 61.1, 60.1 (LexisNexis 2011). 
29 IOWA CODE§ 57.1 (LexisNexis 2011). 
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intractable "positions."30 Once a full set of interests is on the table, the move 
to helping parties generate value-creating options is the mediator's bread and 
butter. But, as noted at the outset, critics of mediation in election disputes 
point to the problem that elections are a zero-sum game. How can you create 
value when the whole point of an election is to pick a winner? 
The drawbacks to using mediation in this context are not limited to this 
puzzle. Some of mediation's biggest advantages in other contexts are 
problematic when applied to election disputes. The principle of 
confidentiality provides a perfect example. For those of us who have tried to 
explain the value of mediation to disputing parties, one of the biggest selling 
points is confidentiality.3I Virtually any litigant can see value in the prospect 
of avoiding airing dirty laundry in court by privately sitting down with a 
mediator to resolve the terms of the dispute. It is well recognized, however, 
that for certain kinds of disputes shutting out the public eye can be quite 
problematic. 
For example, Rojas v. Superior Court32 involved a complaint that owners 
of an apartment building concealed the building's toxic mold problem. The 
tenants sued to compel production of material from an earlier mediation 
between the owners and developers, who both saw it in their best interest to 
keep the existence of a toxic mold problem from the tenants. The lower court 
constructed an exception to mediation confidentiality to allow plaintiffs 
access to the mediation documents. The California Supreme Court reversed, 
finding confidentiality in mediation communications absolute as it applies to 
30 FISHER & URY, supra note I, at 42. The authors lay out the difference between 
"positions" and "interests" by observing that "behind opposed positions lie shared and 
compatible interests .... " !d. The work of the mediator is to identify those interests and 
to help the parties create options that satisfy those shared interests. Earlier, Mary Parker 
Follett described the difference usefully: 
In the Harvard Library one day ... someone wanted the window open, I wanted it 
shut. We opened the window in the next room, where no one was sitting. This was 
not a compromise because there was no curtailing of desire; we both got what we 
really wanted. For I did not want a closed room, I simply did not want the north 
wind to blow directly on me; likewise the other occupant did not want that particular 
window open, he merely wanted more air in the room. 
Mary Parker Follett, Constructive Conflict, in PROPHET OF MANAGEMENT: A 
CELEBRATION OF WRITINGS FROM THE 1920s 67, 69 (Pauline Graham ed., 1995). 
31 See JOHN W. COOLEY, THE MEDIATOR'S HANDBOOK 6 (2d ed. 2006) (listing 
nonpublic nature as the first in a list of the benefits of mediation). 
32 Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260 (Cal. 2004). 
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evidence prepared for the sole and limited purpose of mediation.33 
Confidentiality in election dispute mediation is similarly fraught. Should 
election dispute mediations be conducted behind closed doors? Unlike 
disputes between private parties, the public might demand to know-and 
indeed has the right to know-how election disputes are resolved for the very 
reason that it is the public which must sanction the outcome. Secrecy, even a 
hint of the proverbial smoke--filled room--can cast great doubt on the 
legitimacy of an electoral outcome. 34 
Another reason parties are encouraged to try mediation is self-
determination. Self-determination is often cited as the predominant benefit of 
and central value in mediation because it ensures that outcomes are 
responsive to the parties' interests.35 There is no way to know how a judge 
will decide a case, but mediation affords parties the opportunity to control the 
outcome of their dispute.36 This quality can be very attractive to parties, 
33 ld. at 271. See generally Sarah Williams, Confidentiality in Mediation: Is It 
Encouraging Good Mediation or Bad Conduct? Rojas v. Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 209 (2005). For an interesting discussion of how the 
Uniform Mediation Act's confidentiality provisions managed the problem of public 
health and safety versus confidentiality, see Philip J. Harter, The Uniform Mediation Act: 
An Essential Framework for Self-Determination, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 251, 258 (2002) 
("[What if] the mediator ... learn[s] that a barrel of a highly toxic chemical lies just 
beneath the local playground or that some product poses a very real danger to potential 
users[?) Or, it may be that one of the participants is so upset with what happened that s/he 
plans to seriously harm someone. In these instances the strong presumption of 
confidentiality-which is essential for mediation to work successfully-should be 
overridden and the facts revealed, but only to the extent necessary to address the concern. 
The question is: who decides and by what standards."(citation omitted)). 
34 One way around mediation confidentiality issues is to make election mediation 
sessions open to the public. See Uniform Mediation Act, 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1 
§ 6(a)(2) (LexisNexis 20ll). Indeed, in some instances a state's open meetings laws 
might require access. But this option risks forfeiting the significant benefits 
confidentiality lends to mediation, including encouraging candor and uninhibited option 
generation. 
35 Kimberlee Kovach, "Mediation," THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 305 
(Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone, eds., 2005). 
36 See, e.g., Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Self-Determination in International Mediation: 
Some Preliminary Reflections, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 277, 277 (2006) (noting 
that "the right of self-determination allows parties to participate in decisionmaking and 
voluntarily determine the outcome of their disputes. This understanding of self-
determination is rooted in the philosophical principle of personal autonomy and is 
expressed through the legal doctrine of informed consent. The simple version of the 
normative story states that those who are affected by a dispute should voluntarily consent 
to the outcome of that dispute. In short, "party" self-determination in mediation gives 
ownership of the conflict to the disputants."). 
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particularly in cases in which it is difficult to predict the litigated outcome. 
But self-determination is a tricky concept in election disputes (and indeed in 
any mediated public dispute). Who is the "self' being determined in an 
election dispute? Is it the candidate? The party? The national party? The state 
party? The candidate's supporters?37 The whole project of democracy is a 
form of self-determination: the right of the electorate to determine their 
representatives. Self-determination is quite difficult in the election context.38 
An intimately related challenge to be explored in greater detail below 
involves the scope of parties' authority to settle an election dispute. Suppose 
in a recount contest the two parties agree in mediation that a new election 
should be administered. Do the parties have the power to mandate this 
remedy through a mediated agreement? In certain instances when courts have 
ordered new elections they have undertaken to impose this remedy under 
dubious statutory authority.39 What exactly is the scope of parties' authority 
to settle post-election disputes? Mediated agreements have the force of a 
contract, but can a court enforce such an agreement?40 
An additional hurdle to using mediation in election disputes is the 
problem of choosing a mediator. Is it possible to find a truly "neutral" person 
in the heat of a political battle?41 Professor Edward Foley's elaborate scheme 
37 For an interesting discussion of stakeholders in election disputes, see David 
Kovick & John Hardin Young, ADR Mechanisms, in GUIDELINES FOR UNDERSTANDING, 
ADJUDICATING, AND RESOLVING DISPUTES IN ELECTIONS 227, 245-246 (Chad Vickery 
ed., 2011 ), available at 
http://www. ifes .org/-/media/Files/Publications/Books/20 11 /GUARD E _final __publication. 
pdf. 
38 Note that the problem of self-determination is inherent in many if not most public 
disputes because by definition, a public dispute has an impact on and involves a diverse 
array of parties in interest. See SUSAN L. CARPENTER & W.J.D. KENNEDY, MANAGING 
PUBLIC DISPUTES: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HANDLING CONFLICT AND REACHING 
AGREEMENTS 5 (1988). 
39 Huefner, supra note 24, at n.ll2 (See, e.g., Gunaji v. Macias, 31 P.3d 1008, 1012, 
1016-18 (N.M. 2001) (creating an equitable remedy of partial revote, in contrast to code 
requirement of disregarding the entire precinct); State ex rei. Olson v. Bakken, 329 
N.W.2d 575, 579-82 (N.D. 1983) (approving the equitable remedy of partial special 
election for an identified set of voters whose votes were not counted). 
40 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and 
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases}, 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995) (discussing 
the need for "public adjudication" versus what the parties may themselves desire). 
41 The mediator choice problem goes beyond the neutrality problem. In advocating 
for mediation, this article assumes that mediation will be done well, by a skilled mediator 
able to help the parties realize mediation's many benefits. As longtime public dispute 
mediator Howard Bellman points out, however, "even with surgery, you cannot always 
assume it will be done well." This mediator competency problem should be 
333 
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for empaneling an election tribunal to resolve contested elections provides an 
example of just how difficult a task it is to find people who the public will 
accept as truly neutral in a contested election.42 Even if mediation did have 
some use in election disputes, would the idea be dead on arrival given the 
difficulty of identifying a true neutral?43 
The mediator choice problem leads to another of the biggest challenges 
mediating election disputes: fmality. There is no guarantee in mediation that 
the parties will emerge with an agreement. When agreement is not reached, 
mediators take solace in the belief that mediation has at least facilitated 
communication and understanding between the parties.44 From this 
perspective, failure to reach a settlement is not a failure on the part of the 
mediator if the parties walk away with a better understanding of the other 
side's interests and their own. But some disagreements simply require 
finality; election disputes fall in this category, particularly given the time-
sensitivity inherent in all post-election disputes. Someone must take office. 
This leads to a further difficulty. Mediation is often seen as the best 
alternative in disputes that involve ongoing relationships.45 Elections, 
acknowledged as a potential drawback of mediating election disputes. Telephone 
Interview with Howard Bellman, Mediator/ Arbitrator, August 15, 20 II. 
42 Edward B, Foley, The Analysis and Mitigation of Electoral Errors: Theory, 
Practice, Policy, 18 STAN. L. & PoL'Y REV. 350, 378-79 (2007) ("Consider a five-
member court that convenes only when an election contest is filed. Its members 
consist of four judges who already sit on other general-jurisdiction state courts. 
These four members are selected, one each, by the majority and minority leaders of 
both houses of the state legislature. These selections occur at set intervals, so that 
these members of the court are known in advance of any election contest that may 
occur. The fifth member is an attorney, whether a currently sitting judge or not, 
chosen by the mutual agreement of the other four members. This fifth member also 
serves for a specified term, with a new fifth member chosen by the other four current 
members, when the previous fifth member's term has expired. In this way, also, the 
fifth member is always specified before an election contest arises."). 
43 Election Attorney Ben Ginsberg sees neutrality as the single biggest impediment 
to mediating election disputes. Telephone Interview with Ben Ginsberg, Partner, Patton 
Boggs LLP (June 2, 2011). 
44 Some mediators feel that their job is not even aimed at achieving a finalized 
agreement. "Transformative" mediators, for example, do not view "problem solving" as 
the goal. Instead, they see party empowerment, communication, and recognition as the 
object of the mediation exercise. See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, 
THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND 
RECOGNITION 108-12 (1994). 
45 Frank E. A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer, Matching Cases and Dispute 
Resolution Procedures: Detailed Analysis Leading to a Mediation-Centered Approach, 
334 
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however, are not about preserving relationships between the two sides. 
Enhancing "understanding" between the parties is not relevant or useful in 
the context of election disputes. Chances are good that . candidates from 
opposing parties will not have an ongoing relationship post-election. 
Furthermore, political parties in this country have been trying to understand 
each other for generations, so far without much success. 
Finally, smooth and efficient elections are a cornerstone of democratic 
transfer of power. Too much litigation threatens to derail the legitimacy of 
the electoral outcome. Scholars have pointed to the dramatic increase in 
litigation as a threat to the legitimacy of elections in this country.46 One hope 
would be that mediation could stem this tide and help disputants avoid the 
damage protracted litigation does to public confidence. Others might argue 
that injecting "alternative" dispute resolution processes like mediation into an 
already fraught dispute environment is more than the public could take. Most 
people are not familiar with mediation or its core principles,47 and may be 
more suspect of mediation than tried-and-true adversarial resolution in the 
courts.48 Litigation is at least a process that the public (and election 
attorneys) understand.49 
As the above discussion makes clear, there are some very real reasons to 
pause when thinking through the value of mediation in post-election disputes. 
11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 31 (2006) ("Facilitative processes, such as mediation, are 
less appropriate in cases where facts need to be determined."). 
46Jnfra note 62, at 29. 
47 Neither, for that matter, are lawyers, who are often skeptical of mediation (at best) 
and seek to game the mediation process (at worst). See John Lande & Jean R. Sternlight, 
The Potential Contribution of ADR to an Integrated Curriculum: Preparing Law Students 
for Real World Lawyering, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 247 (2010) ("Many believe 
that lawyers' adversarial methods and mindsets are inherently inconsistent with 
mediation."); Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 57-59 
(1982) (exploring how lawyers look at the world might contribute to lawyer distrust of 
mediation); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Lawyers, Non-Lawyers and Mediation: 
Rethinking the Professional Monopoly from a Problem-Solving Perspective, 7 HARv. 
NEGOT. L. REv. 235, 252 (2002) (lawyers' involvement in mediation might make ADR 
"more adversarial and legalistic") as cited in Robert Rubinson, Mapping the World: Facts 
and Meaning in Adjudication and Mediation, 63 ME. L. REv. 61, 87, n.l63 (2010). 
48 Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of ADR and Public 
Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REv. 949, 985 (2000) ("[w]hile training and professional 
culture may help explain lawyer skepticism about ADR, the lay public also has reasons to 
view ADR as less legitimate than trial."). 
49 Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1087 (1984) (noting that 
certain cases present "a genuine social need for an authoritative interpretation of law"). 
See also David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 
2619,2633-35 (1995). 
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Indeed, the range of reasons why mediation is ill-suited to election disputes is 
undoubtedly why no sustained effort has thus far been made to incorporate it. 
As the following section portrays, however, there are enough shortcomings 
to litigating post-election disputes that mediation deserves another look. 
IV. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF POST-ELECTION LITIGATION 
There is little question that post-election litigation is a necessary 
component of ensuring that our elections are fair. Voters, candidates, and 
parties have consistently turned to courts to resolve perplexing post-election 
disputes, sometimes asking courts to impose extraordinary remedies such as 
ordering a new election,50 disqualifying a candidate,5I declaring a winner,52 
and even resolving the question of who should take office when the winning 
candidate has died.53 There is no scarcity of post-election litigation. In 
50 See, e.g., Long v. Bryant, 992 So. 2d 673, 680, 686 (Ala. 2008) (upholding the 
Perry Circuit Court's decision to order a runoff election after a recount revealed there 
was no winner of a mayoral race); Gooch v. Hendrix, 851 P.2d 1321, 1322, 1327, 1330-
32 (Cal. 1993) (affirming the Superior Court of Fresno County's annulment of a school 
board election and order for a new election when there was substantial evidence that 
fraudulent votes affected the election's outcome); Thompson v. Jones, 17 So. 3d 524, 
526, 529 (Miss. 2008) (ordering a special election for county sheriff after the circuit court 
released its conclusion that illegal absentee ballots had voided the Democratic primary 
after the general election had already occurred); Reese v. Duncan, 80 S.W.3d 650, 653, 
656 (Tex. App. 2002) (upholding an order for a new election when the number of illegal 
votes counted could have materially affected the outcome of the election). 
51 See, e.g., Stephenson v. Woodward, 182 S.W.3d 162, 164, 173 (Ky. 2005) 
(affirming the post-election disqualification of a winning state senatorial candidate who 
failed to meet the residdicy requirement); Ellis v. Meeks, 957 S.W.2d 213,214,217 (Ky. 
1997) (disqualifying a winning ward alderman candidate for visiting polling places on 
election day); Smith v. Brito, 173 P.3d 351, 352, 356 (Wyo. 2007) (upholding the 
disqualification of a winning town council candidate who was not a registered voter at the 
time of filing). 
52 See, e.g., Waltman v. Rowell, 913 So. 2d 1083, 1084-85, 1092 (Ala. 2005) 
(declaring the incumbent candidate for city council the winner after the circuit court had 
decided that his opponent had won after hearing an election contest); Mcintosh v. 
Sanders, 831 So. 2d 1111, 1112, 1116 (Miss. 2002) (affirming the Kemper County 
Circuit Court's declaration of a winner of the county election commissioner race after 
one of the candidates was disqualified); Huefner, supra note 24, at 297 (describing a trial 
court's reversal of election results based on statistical fmdings concerning ballot layout 
(citing Bradley v. Perrodin, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 402, 405-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003))). 
53 See, e.g., Tataii v. Yoshina, No. 25599, 2003 Haw. LEXIS 237, at *2-7 (Haw. 
May 22, 2003) (confirming that the deceased wirmer of the general election for a seat in 
the U.S. Congress was the proper nominee and that a special election was the proper way 
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exponentially increasing numbers, parties use courts to resolve election 
disputes of all kinds. 54 This article argues, however, that there are some very 
real drawbacks to litigating post-election disputes. 
Post-election disputes arise most commonly when the vote tallies are 
close enough that the loser thinks he or she might win if the votes were 
recounted or otherwise challenged. When an election produces a clear 
winner, voters and candidates are often disinclined to mount a dispute.5S 
Election irregularities and inconsistencies and gaps in state election statutes 
often go completely unnoticed for the simple reason that the tally did not 
approach the "margin oflitigation."56 
When elections are close, a rush to court is common-indeed, many state 
election statutes mandate that post-election disputes such as recounts be 
resolved in court. 57 Heading to court fulfills several needs. In the case of a 
candidate calling for a recount, litigation signals that the losing candidate 
will not give in; it provides publicity for a candidate who believes the 
election outcome is unjust; and finally it is a means of reaching out to a 
neutral party to declare judgment with (relative) finality. Although, as noted 
above, many states mandate administrative and/or quasi-judicial procedures 
to fill the vacancy); Lockard v. Miles, 882 N.E.2d 288, 288-89 (Ind. 2008) (affirming 
that the winner of a party caucus held after the candidate who won the primary died 
should be on the general ballot instead of the runner-up in the primary); Evans v. State 
Election Bd. of the State of Oklahoma, 804 P.2d 1125, 1126-27, 1129, 1131 (Okla. 1990) 
(determining that the candidate for district judge who won the most votes, though 
deceased, was the victor and a special election should be held to fill the vacancy). See 
also Faulder v. Mendocine County Bd. of Supervisors, 144 Cal. App. 4th 1362, 1366-67 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (calling for the cancellation and sealing of election results and the 
scheduling of a special election when one of the two candidates for district attorney died 
prior to the election). 
54 Richard Hasen, The Supreme Court's Shrinking Election Law Docket, 2001-2010: 
A Legacy of Bush v. Gore or Fear of the Roberts Court?, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, 
lR VINE SCHOOL OF LAW LEGAL STIJDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES PAPER No. 2011-11. 
55 Relying on close elections to tell us whether a state's election apparatus is 
functioning is less than optimal. Problems will only be revealed if and when a close 
election happens. Foley, supra note 42, at 375 (in this article, Professor Foley suggests 
ways that states might address election irregularities without waiting for outcome-
affecting errors to come to light.). 
56 Richard Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election 
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937,938 (2005). 
57 See supra Part II; see, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 29A.68.0ll (2007) (judicial 
remedy when certain conditions are met, i.e., neglect of duty on part of an election 
official, any state voter can contest the result of an election in court); ARiz. REv. STAT. 
ANN.§ 16-672 (1980) (any elector can contest results); N.M. STAT. ANN. §1-14-1 (2004) 
(New Mexico statute allows a candidate to contest the results of an election in court). 
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prior to litigation,58 the march to court when elections are close has never 
been seriously questioned.59 It is widely held to be the cleanest way to 
resolve post-election disputes.60 Indeed, election litigation has skyrocketed 
since Bush v. Gore in 2000.61 
However, there are real reasons to question the assumption that court is 
the best place for post-election dispute resolution. As seasoned election 
lawyers will tell you, post-election litigation is anything but straightforward. 
Post-election litigation can drag on for months and months and can cost 
candidates and taxpayers millions of dollars. Lawyers in the Franken-
Coleman recount in Minnesota estimated a price tag of $10 million in legal 
fees alone.62 On a cost basis, alternatives should certainly be explored. 
58 See supra Part II. 
59 Kovick and Young note that one factor opposing the use of ADR is in instances 
where countries have a "strong, credible and independent judici[al] .. . system ... that 
can be relied upon to hear and resolve election complaints in a fair and timely manner." 
KOVICK & YOUNG, supra note 37, at 255. Because the U.S. judiciary is widely seen as 
credible, independent, and strong, the tendency is to assume that courts are the natural 
venue for election disputes. 
6° Foley, supra note 42, at 376 ("The prevailing public conception of courts, right or 
wrong, is that their job is to decide [election] cases according to the requirements laid 
down by the law .. . without regard to discretionary considerations of politics."). As noted 
above, some even advocate for increased judicial oversight of elections. See Recent Case, 
Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565 (2004), 118 HARV. L. 
REv. 2461, 2464 (2005) (advocating more judicial oversight of unilateral interpretations 
of federal election law made by partisan state election officials). 
6l See Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death ofBush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REv. I, 
28-29 (2007); Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REv. 69 (2009). 
Hasen's results show that election litigation more than doubled shortly after 2001 and has 
held steady at that amount for the decade since Bush v. Gore. Pre-2000, the country 
averaged 94 election cases (in both state and federal courts) annually. !d. at 90. The 
average number of election-related cases over the past ten years has been 239. Richard L. 
Hasen, Election Law Litigation Remained at Double Its Pre-Bush v. Gore Rate, 
ELECTION LAw BLDG (March 31, 2011 ), http://electionlawblog.org/archives/O 19119.html. 
6Z See JAY WEINER, THIS IS NOT FLORIDA: How AL FRANKEN WON THE MINNESOTA 
SENATE RECOUNT, 223-24 (2010) (during the 2008 Minnesota senate recount and related 
litigation, candidates AI Fmnken and Norm Coleman spent $5.7 million and $4.4 million 
on legal fees, respectively); John Gibeaut, Electing to Litigate As Primaries Begin, 
Voters, State Officials and Lawyers Brace for More and More Lawsuits, 94 A.B.A. J., 40, 
46 (2008) (one election lawsuit cost the state of Ohio more than $5 million.); Erin 
Butcher-Lyden, supra note 4, at 537 (just ten of the twenty-three lawsuits against the state 
of Ohio during the 2004 election cost the state a combined $1 million.); CoNNY 
McCORMACK, THE COST OF STATEWIDE RECOUNTS: A CASE STUDY OF MINNESOTA AND 
WASHINGTON, THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES 23, 35 (2010), available at 
http:/ /www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/MN _ W A _recounts _report. pdf 
338 
HeinOnline  -- 27 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 339 2012
MEDIATION AND POST-ELECTION LITIGATION 
Aside from cost, protracted litigation risks alienating the electorate.63 
The public may be satisfied when election controversies are decided quickly 
and resolutely in court, but they become less enamored when litigation drags 
on for months and months, particularly if an elected seat remains vacant as a 
result. But more than practical concerns surface: when elections are decided 
in courts, voters come to believe that they lack voice. Given the dismal state 
of voter participation in elections in this country,64 protracted and habitual 
litigation poses a real risk to the franchise. 
A further reason litigation is problematic in post-election disputes is the 
issue of courts' relationships with the political process. Time and again, 
judges in election law cases note a profound hesitance to enter the "political 
thicket." As Justice Frankfurter wrote in Colegrove v. Green in 1946, "[i]t is 
hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the 
people."65 What is more, scholars have noted that judges may hesitate to 
impose remedies in the election context in which even minor corrections can 
have broad, systemic implications.66 . 
Courts are also awkward places to resolve post-election disputes in cases 
that lack statutory guidance. When state election statutes compel judicial 
review, those statutes are often silent when it comes to substantive guidelines 
on how courts should proceed. 67 As a result, courts often have to choose 
(finding a manual recount in Minnesota cost counties a total of $460,000 and a manual 
and machine recount combined cost the state of Washington $1.16 million). 
63 Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death a/Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1, 5-6 
(2007) ("Bush v. Gore's main legacy has been to increase the amount of election-related 
litigation. As election law has become a political strategy, it threatens to further 
undermine public confidence in the electoral process. No lemonade, only lemons."). 
64 A study of voter turnout since 1945 listed the United States at No. 138 (out of 
169) in a ranking of countries votes to voting age population ratio. See Voter Turnout 
Rates from a Comparative Perspective, available at 
http://www.idea.int/publications/vtluploadNoter%20tumout.pdf. 
65 Colegove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549,553-54 (1946). 
66 See Developments in the Law: Voting and Democracy, VII. Election 
Administration: Judicial Review and Remedial Deterrence, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1188, 
1191 (2006) ("[j]udges may be deterred from ordering a systemic remedy [in election 
cases] because it appears more difficult to implement than the remedy in a standard [non-
election] case between individuals."). See also Richard L. Hasen, Judges as Political 
Regulators: Evidence and Options for Institutional Change, in RACE, REFORM, AND 
REGULATION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY (Guy-Uriel Charles, Heather K. Gerken & MichaelS. Kang eds., 2011 ). 
67 Huefner, supra note 24, at 277 (citing Developments in the Law-Elections, 
supra note 21, at 1311 (noting that election contest statutes provide "little guidance as to 
the grounds that are cognizable")). 
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between available remedies (adjustment of vote totals, new elections, fines, 
penalties or injunctions, and so forth) with very little to go on aside from 
common law and principles of equity.68 
Another challenge in resolving disputed elections in courts is the related 
problem of perceived judicial neutrality. In the past, when state supreme 
courts have split on election cases along partisan lines, as was the case, for 
example, in the 1982 Illinois governor's race between Republican incumbent 
James Thomson and Democratic opponent Adlai Stevenson III, the 
credibility and neutrality of the judiciary is threatened. As Professor Foley 
observes of this phenomenon: 
Whether these split decisions ... precisely correspond to the partisan 
affiliation of the judges on those courts is beside the point. Nor does it 
matter whether any of these judges were actually motivated by political 
considerations, rather than their good faith perception of what the law 
required of them. Rather, the problem is that these teeter-totter rulings 
reveal that the applicable law is not so crystal clear that the judges have no 
choice but to follow its command, and therefore the judges are free to 
decide the case in accordance with their political preferences if they are so 
inclined.69 
The public's confidence in neutral, non-political adjudication of disputes 
is put at risk each time an election case, by nature fraught with partisan 
conflict, confronts the courts. 
A final reason why courts are problematic forums for election disputes is 
that judges are often ill-equipped to handle election law matters.7° Most of 
68 !d.; see also Daniel P. Tokaji, Commentary, An Unsafe Harbor: Recounts, 
Contests, and the Electoral College, 106 MICH. L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 84, 87 (2008) 
(noting the awkward problem of state election laws deferring to federal laws that do not 
exist, Tokaji provides the example of Section 3515.08 of the Ohio Revised Code under 
which contests of elections to federal office are to be "conducted in accordance with the 
applicable provisions of federal law." Tokaji goes on to note the trouble with this 
scheme: "The problem is that there are no federal laws allowing judicial contest 
proceedings over disputed federal elections. Nor is it clear that Congress would have the 
constitutional power to impose such a procedure for presidential elections, even it if so 
desired. Instead, federal law refers back to the 'fmal determination' made under state Jaw 
pursuant to 3 U.S.C. § 5. In other words, we have circular references .... The effect of 
Ohio's law thus appears to be the elimination of any judicial contest proceedings in any 
federal election taking place in that state."). 
69 Foley, supra note 42, at 3 77-78. 
70 Recognizing the lack of resources state judges face in election cases, the National 
Conference of Chief Justices of State Supreme Courts identified this as a problem of 
great significance and encouraged the National Center for State Courts, partnering with 
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the approximately 25,00071 state and 60072 federal court judges in the United 
States lack specific . expertise in election law. Many election law cases 
involve matters of first impression that must be resolved quickly in the 
context of intense partisan conflict-a pressure-filled circumstance judges 
rightly abhor. 
For these reasons, resolving post-election disputes in court is not always 
optimal. Although litigation has its place, the next section explores ways in 
which mediation might, in certain instances, play an important role in 
alleviating pressure on courts to resolve post-election disputes. 
V. THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION IN POST-ELECTION DISPUTES 
As a general matter, mediators are trained to guide parties through 
disputes in ways that make the dispute resolution process more efficient and 
the outcome more solid. Mediators are trained to help open channels of 
communication, to facilitate the process of direct negotiation, to help parties 
understand and frame their dispute, and to act as an agent of reality in 
instances where parties may have an inflated sense of the strength of an 
argument.73 Mediation is effective because mediators can assist parties in 
solving problems "more integratively, at less cost, with greater party 
participation, and with the possibility of preventing ... some disputes."74 
Whether these generally accepted benefits of mediation have application in 
the post-election context hinges on two central variables: first, the nature of 
the post-election dispute at issue; and second the style of mediation 
employed. 
the William & Mary Law School, to form the Election Law Program to help address this 
problem by creating resources for judges on election law. See ELECTION LAw PROGRAM, 
http://www.electionlawissues.org. 
71 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, State Court Organization 
(2004), available at http:/ /bj s.ojp. usdoj .gov/content/pub/pdf/sco04.pdf. 
72 U.S. Courts, Judicial Facts and Figures 2009 (2009), available 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2009/Table I 0 l.p 
df. 
73 JOHNW. COOLEY, THEMEDIATOR'SHANDBOOK30-31 (2d ed. 2006). 
74 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral: 
Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 TEMP. L. REv. 785, 802 (1999). 
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A. Which Post-Election Disputes are Appropriate for Mediation? 
The International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) recently 
examined the use of ADR in election conflicts.75 The book is aimed at 
building election infrastructure in post-conflict and developing democracies. 
Its authors identify several types of election disputes ill-suited for ADR 
including: (1) disputes relating to fundamental rights, (2) cases in which 
binding precedent is desirable, and (3) cases in which the court system can 
provide a timely, credible decision.76 These factors provide a useful starting 
point. There are certainly instances in which fundamental rights come into 
play in post-election disputes. Any time a ballot is invalidated, for example, a 
voter's fundamental right to exercise the franchise is jeopardized.77 In 
addition, there is very often the need for precedent setting in post-election 
disputes, particularly in the recount context, as states build experience 
managing them.78 Finally, thanks to the health of the U.S. judicial system, its 
courts are capable of delivering timely and credible decisions in the majority 
of instances. 
Although these general exemptions provide a good rough guide, this 
article argues that there are a certain subset of post-election disputes which 
do not directly involve fundamental rights, for which administrative 
precedent setting is more important than judicial precedent setting, and which 
courts are ill-equipped to manage: post-election process disputes. Post-
election process disputes are distinguished from outcome-determinative post-
election disputes. For the purposes of this article, "outcome-determinative" 
refers to those disputes for which the resolution will directly impact a vote 
tally. An example of an outcome-determinative dispute would be whether or 
not the voter intended to vote for Candidate X or whether the factors required 
to prove fraud were sufficiently argued. These disputes require a third-party 
neutral such as a judge or election official to issue a ruling one way or 
another. 
75 GUIDELINES FOR UNDERSTANDING, ADJUDICATING, AND RESOLVING DISPUTES IN 
ELECTIONS (Chad Vickery ed., 2011), available at 
http://www. ifes.org/-/media/Fi les/Publications/Books/20 11 /GU ARDE _final _pub I ication. 
pdf. 
76 /d. at 254-55. 
77 As one state supreme court justice noted, "the right to have one's vote counted is 
as important as the act itself." Coleman v. Ritchie, 758 N.W.2d 306, 311 (Minn. 2008). 
78 See, e.g., Tamney v. Atkins, 209 N.Y. 202,205 (N.Y. 1913) (cited broadly for the 
proposition that the ability of courts to engage in judicial review of election disputes is 
bounded by state statute). 
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Unlike outcome-determinative election disputes, process disputes are 
those encompassing mechanics and procedural rules for how, in the case of 
recounts, votes will be counted. 79 In the context of a recount, these kinds of 
process disputes can include the following kinds of issues:8° 
• When can a candidate challenge ballots? 
• When can a candidate examine election materials? 
• What is the definition of a valid ballot? 
• How will voter intent be determined? 
• What are the standards for determining whether a ballot has 
met technical or procedural requirements (such as initials by poll 
clerks)? Should ballots be counted if the technical defect is not caused 
by the voter? 
• Should absentee ballots be counted if postmarked prior to 
Election Day but received by the clerk after Election Day? 
In the vast majority of jurisdictions, when a recount is triggered, either 
automatically or because the losing candidate has petitioned for a recount, it 
is far from clear what procedural rules will govern the recount. State statutes 
and regulations often leave unresolved a wide range of procedural questions 
from matters as seemingly insignificant, such as where tables will be set up, 
to significant questions of standards for determining valid ballots. Even when 
state statutes and regulations include specific procedural rules, wide gaps 
must be filled before the recount can proceed. 81 
Vagaries concerning the validity of absentee ballots illustrate the point. If 
absentee ballot envelopes must be signed by the voter, should a ballot count 
79 Note that the line between outcome-determinative versus post-election process 
disputes is not always clear. Process decisions can turn out to be outcome-determinative. 
For example, in one of the closest elections in U.S. history, the 2004 Washington state 
governor's race, candidates asked a judge, inter alia, to pick a method by which to 
eliminate illegal votes. The judge could order a new election, require direct evidence (i.e., 
ask voters to testify), or use a "proportional deduction" method by which the judge would 
estimate whom each illegal voter voted for based on the precinct in which the voter lived. 
The choice between these various processes could be outcome-determinative. One can 
imagine that a mediated resolution of this process question would have been an effective 
means of resolving the dispute, but might have indeed determined the outcome. See 
Borders v. Kings County, No. 05-2-00027-3, Slip Op. at 4 (Wash. Super. Ct. June 24, 
2005) discussed in Developments in the Law: Voting and Democracy, IV. Deducting 
Illegal Votes in Contested Elections, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1155, 1155-56 (2006). 
80 These examples are drawn from TIMOTHY DOWNS, ET. AL., THE RECOUNT PRIMER 
19-20 (1994). 
81 Telephone interview with election law expert John Hardin Young, Partner, 
Sandler, Reiff, Young & Lamb (May 24, 2011). 
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if signed by the voter's spouse? What if the spouse has a power of attorney? 
Must the power of attorney be a blanket power of attorney? What if the 
power of attorney was obtained for health decisions only? What about 
distinguishing marks on ballots like signatures that would typically nullify a 
vote? Overseas and military voters often write passport numbers or military 
ID numbers on absentee ballots. Should these votes be tossed? If a complete 
absentee ballot requires a full address, what if the voter leaves off her zip 
code? What if the voter has moved to a different apartment at the same 
address but lists the old apartment number on the absentee ballot envelope? 
What if the voter abbreviates "Rd." or leaves the word "Road" off altogether 
when stating her address? Literally dozens of such questions hang in the 
balance in recounts. And that's just with respect to absentee ballots. 
Although process disputes are not directly outcome-determinative, this is 
not to say they matter less. In fact, they matter quite a bit. As we have seen in 
countless recounts, lawyers on both sides forward impassioned arguments for 
why ambiguities in statutory process language should be managed one way 
versus another. Resolving process disputes is tricky business. Each side 
invariably will argue that even the smallest process decision can have an 
impact on the final tally. As one prominent recount lawyer explains, "Every 
procedural call has an advantage and disadvantage that both sides will fight 
tooth and nail to preserve."82 Depending on their assessment of the impact on 
their client, most election lawyers will admit to alternately forwarding 
impassioned arguments for strict technical compliance with a vague statutory 
provision in one instance, and equally impassioned arguments for the idea 
that technicalities impede acknowledging voter intent in the next. 
There are numerous ways in which states attempt to fill procedural gaps 
in recounts. In Virginia, for example, state statute requires a judge to set forth 
the specific procedure that will guide the recount process.83 In practice, the 
state court judge will work with the parties to hammer out a preliminary 
procedural order followed by a final order. 84 In other states, a state board of 
82 !d. 
83 VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-802(8) (1950) (" ... the chief judge of the circuit court 
shall call a preliminary hearing at which (i) motions may be disposed of and (ii) the rules 
of procedure may be fixed, both subject to review by the full court."). 
84 See, e.g., Goode v. Perriello, Recount Procedural Order, Case No. CL08002666-
00 (2008) (specifies the procedures leading up to the recount, the date and time of the 
recount, the manner of court supervision of the recount, the location of the recount, how 
the vote tabulators will be programmed, what the testing requirements will be, how 
recount officials will be selected, rules governing recount observers, training procedures 
for recount officials, contingencies for inclement weather, and various other procedural 
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elections or the secretary of state's office will facilitate a process to 
determine the procedural rules of the recount.85 At the other end of the 
spectrum, in some states the authority to fill process gaps left by election 
statutes falls to individual county election administrators, which, as we know 
after Bush v. Gore, can lead to frustrating results. 86 
Experience has shown that judicial misjudgment in resolving process 
disputes-either because of unanticipated consequences of a given judicial 
process decree, or events unanticipated at the time of the ruling-may 
protract process disputes unnecessarily. Process decisions in post-election 
disputes-particularly recounts-involve sophisticated and sometimes 
unknowable variables. Judges, many of whom have never tried election 
matters before, are seldom equipped to understand the impact of one process 
decision versus another. They are instead reliant on passionate partisan 
arguments of campaign attorneys. Even a politically neutral judge who takes 
her political leanings out of the mix will feel uncertain in this territory. This 
is to say nothing of the elected, partisan judge who might be called to make 
process decisions. 
In an environment in which judges and state election administrators often 
lack guidance on procedural details, election attorneys routinely rush to fill 
the vacuum. Individual campaigns hire nationally prominent, partisan 
election attorneys to help navigate procedural uncertainties. From Bush v. 
Gore to Coleman v. Franken, fierce partisan election lawyering has become 
the accepted model. 87 In many recounts, partisan recount experts are often 
details. The judge in this case allowed the parties access to the process of establishing 
procedural rules. 
8S See infra Part VI.B. 
86 Wisconsin provides a good example of this decentralized approach. Kevin 
Kennedy of the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board website confirms this 
characterization by noting that "Wisconsin has the most decentralized election 
administration in the United States". The site goes on to note that Wisconsin state law 
gives each county's Board of Canvassers the primary authority to conduct recounts, and 
to decide which ballots should and should not be counted. See Statewide Supreme Court 
Recount Update, http:l/gab.wi/node/1849. 
87 Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming US. Election 
Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 957-59 
(2005) (documenting the increase of election-related litigation since 2000); Richard L. 
Hasen, Will Armies of Lawyers in Service to Political Parties Determine Election 2008?, 
THE LOYOLA LAWYER, Aug. 19, 2008, at 5 (anticipating a number of lawyers-many of 
ihem volunteer-deployed in the 2008 election); Susan Greene et al., Legal Eagles Will 
Eye Voting: 'Armies of Lawyers' Tapped, DENVER POST, Oct. 17, 2004, at Cl; Kenneth P. 
Vogel, Election Lawyers are a Hot Commodity, POLITICO (Mar. 6, 2007, 5:29 pm), 
345 
HeinOnline  -- 27 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 346 2012
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 27:2 2012] 
the only real source of combined wisdom on the subject. Experienced 
election attorneys who have seen recounts unfold in other states have a huge 
leg up when dealing with state administrators and judges who lack a multi-
state perspective. As the Minnesota case study below illustrates, this 
phenomenon has the problematic effect of leaving democracy in the hands of 
whichever side has the more sophisticated lawyer. Even in a case where 
lawyers are evenly matched, lawyers are by trade zealous and partisan 
advocates for their client's interests, not the public interest. 
What is often missing is a seasoned expert to guide the process and raise 
flags when process issues arise. Experienced election mediators could 
perform just such a role. The next section examines the second variable: the 
model of mediation might be most appropriate in this setting. 
B. Which Mediation Model is Appropriate for Mediation? 
The question of whether mediators can do a better job than courts in 
helping resolve post-election process disputes can only be answered by 
understanding the nature of modern mediation practice and the types of 
mediation on offer. Many mediators prefer a mediation style in which they 
do not weigh in on the substance of the dispute, instead facilitating a process 
through which the parties can reach an agreement that meets their interests. 
This approach is generally known as "facilitative mediation."88 A facilitative 
mediator refrains from, for example, providing her opinion about which side 
has made the better argument or has the stronger case, even when pressed by 
one or both sides to do so (as is common). A facilitative mediator will also 
refrain from suggesting options for the parties to consider, preferring instead 
to facilitate a process in which the parties generate their own options.89 But 
just because a mediator adopts a facilitative approach does not mean the 
mediator cannot be "directive" of the process. In fact, facilitative .mediators 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0307/3019.html (finding there is more demand 
than supply of top-caliber election lawyers). 
88 Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REv. 937, 943-44 (1997) (facilitative mediation is a "dispute resolution process 
through which parties are taught how to resolve their own disputes, listen to each other 
differently, broaden their own capacities for understanding and collaboration, and create 
resolutions that build relationships, generate more harmony, and are 'win-win.'"). 
89 The philosophical underpinning behind this principle is at least in part, that by 
suggesting an option the mediator might appear non-neutral, or as if he or she is pushing 
a resolution on the parties. Doing so flies in the face of a core value in mediation: self-
determination. See Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not 
Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937,945 (1997). 
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recognize driving the process as their chief role. So, for example, the 
facilitative mediator may make decisions about which issue will be discussed 
when, when (and if) private caucuses should take place, how broadly or 
narrowly the parties' dispute should be addressed in mediation, and so 
forth.9o By taking control of the process, facilitative mediators enhance the 
efficiency of dispute resolution, ensure that the full scope of the dispute is 
addressed, constructively enhance communication between the two sides, 
and assist the parties in generating realistic options. 
At the other end of the spectrum is what is often referred to as 
"evaluative" mediation.9I The evaluative mediator weighs in on substance. 
The evaluative mediator, for example, may give her opinion on the value of 
settlement, the strength of an argument, or the mediator's opinion of how a 
court might rule. Evaluative mediators might also suggest options for the 
parties to consider. Evaluative strategies are often employed to move the 
mediation forward, typically when the facilitative model reaches an impasse. 
Often evaluation is solicited by the parties.92 Mediators more comfortable 
with an evaluative role will weigh in on certain matters preemptively. 
Evaluative mediators view facilitative mediation as too passive, robbing 
90 Leonard Riskin described a continuum in the role of mediators on the question of 
"problem definition" between those mediators who take a broad approach versus those 
who prefer to mediate only the narrow issue presented. See Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator 
Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques, 12 ALTERNATNES TO HIGH COST LlTIG. 111, 
111 (1994) ("[a] mediator who starts with a broad orientation ... assumes that the parties 
can benefit if the mediation goes beyond the narrow issues that normally define legal 
disputes. Important interests often lie beneath the positions that the participants assert. 
Accordingly, the mediator [can] ... help the participants understand and fulfill those 
interests-at least if they wish to do so."). 
91 For a view of the dangers of evaluative mediation, see generally Lela Love, The 
Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 937 
(1997); see also Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, "Evaluative" Mediation Is an 
Oxymoron, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31 (1996). 
92 The need for case evaluation has evolved into a specialty commonly referred to as 
Early Neutral Evaluation (ENE). ENE "was first developed in federal district court in the 
Northern District of California" as a process by which a party (or parties) to a dispute 
seeks out an evaluation of their claim from an expert. Frank E. A. Sander & Lukasz 
Rozdeiczer, Matching Cases and Dispute Resolution Procedures: Detailed Analysis 
Leading to A Mediation-Centered Approach, ll HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 13 (2006). 
ENE is seen as a settlement technique for disputes in which parties are far apart and 
might benefit from hearing from a neutral party how the law likely applies to their case or 
hearing an objective assessment of the strength of their case. See American Arbitration 
Association, Early Neutral Evaluation: Getting an Expert's Assessment, Practical 
Guidelines and Steps for Getting Started, available at 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=35761 (last visited Sept. 21, 2011). 
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mediators of tools that could be used to move disputes more quickly towards 
resolution. Such evaluative mediators argue that in certain circumstances 
mediators better help parties resolve disputes if they selectively address the 
substance of the dispute where appropriate and/or offer suggestions about 
how it might be resolved.93 
Although many, including this author, remain dedicated to the idea that 
facilitative mediation is preferable in most instances,94 there is growing 
acknowledgment that in certain kinds of mediations, evaluative techniques 
may be appropriate.95 Mediators who possess substantive expertise in a 
specific field can use that knowledge and experience to aid the resolution of 
certain kinds of disputes.96 Post-election process dispute resolution, for 
reasons to follow, falls into this category. 
Scholars have pointed to a number of ways an "expert" mediator can be 
useful. For example, a mediator with substantive expertise can help by 
educating the parties about ways in which the law may vindicate their rights 
or ways in which similarly situated parties have resolved their disputes.97 
Mediators with substantive expertise may also help parties avoid an unfair 
result.98 Mediators with subject matter experience can also raise bidden 
dangers that parties might not foresee or provide ideas for options that have 
been useful in other contexts.99 
93 L. Randolph Lowry, To Evaluate or Not: That Is Not the Question, 38 FAM. & 
CONCIUATION CTS. REv. 48, 55 (2000) ("evaluation is a technique to move parties from 
positions they have taken that have resulted in impasse to a mutually agreeable position 
so a settlement then takes place."). 
94 Huge concerns about party self-determination, mediator neutrality, and problems 
associated with quality control of mediator evaluations drives this skepticism. See supra 
note 82. 
95 It should be noted that facilitative mediation techniques need not be thrown out 
the window when an evaluative model is adopted. Indeed, the best evaluative mediators 
recognize the benefits of facilitative principles and work to incorporate them as they 
mediate, effectively shifting between a facilitative and evaluative approach as the 
situation dictates. Telephone Interview with Howard Bellman (August 15, 2011). 
96 Brian Jarrett, The Future of Mediation: A Sociological Perspective, 2009 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 49, 70 (2009) (noting that sector specialization has led in some instances to the 
beneficial use of a more evaluative approach, Jarrett uses U.N. conciliation efforts as an 
example in which, "the United Nations provides a kind of practical power politics in its 
mediation programs that have precious little to do with the objectivity, impartiality, and 
neutrality associated with the facilitative model."). 
97 Scott H. Hughes, Facilitative Mediation or Evaluative Mediation: May Your 
Choice Be A Wise One, 59 ALA. LAW. 246, 247 (1998). 
98 Id. 
99 Cris M. Currie, Mediating Off the Grid, 59 DISP. RESOL. J. 9, 12 (2004). 
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Perhaps the ·biggest reason an evaluative model may be useful in post-
election process disputes has to do with information imbalance. One 
campaign might hire a sophisticated legal team that understands how various 
process decisions affect its candidate. If the other campaign has not hired a 
sophisticated election attorney (or if the attorney hired proves to be less 
skillful than opposing counsel) this imbalance might prove a great 
disadvantage. This disadvantage is not just problematic for the candidate, but 
also for the voters who selected that candidate. In a recount scenario, poor or 
uninformed lawyering can result in the disenfranchisement of voters. As 
noted above, state election administrators and judges also vary widely in 
process sophistication. Over time, should mediation become more widely 
used in this context, a cadre of "election mediators" might develop. One 
could imagine that just as Ken Feinberg is now the go-to person for mass 
disaster claims, 100 specialized and respected election mediators might 
eventually apply accumulated expertise to resolving post-election process 
disputes efficiently. Seasoned election law mediators who have developed a 
track record for helping parties identify and resolve process disputes could 
prove invaluable towards more efficient resolution of post-election process 
matters. 101 
Election mediators might prove useful for a further reason. Parties in 
mediation have more flexibility in crafting solutions that resolve more 
aspects of their dispute than the narrow set of issues presented in a court 
proceeding.! 02 This is at least in part because a good mediator will foster a 
lOO Ashby Jones, Ken Feinberg (Who Else?) To Handle Oil-Spill Escrow Fund, 
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (June 16, 2010), http:/lblogs.wsj.com/law/2010/06/16/ken-feinberg-
who-else-to-handle-oil-spill-escrow-fund. 
101 In an article in which she argues that lawyers should adopt a more problem-
solving, less adversarial role, Carrie Menkel-Meadow describes a perspective that could 
be used in the election dispute resolution context to good effect: 
[L]awyer-mediators may use law in their work as facilitators of negotiated solutions 
to litigational or transactional problems: [they can] help ... [clients] evaluate the 
merits of an argument, the legality of a solution, assisting in the drafting of an 
agreement, or in cases of evaluative mediation, actually predicting what a court 
might do with a particular case or offering particular substantive resolutions of 
particular legal issues. 
See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 74, at 804. 
102 Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and 
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 7, 33 (1996) (A 
facilitative mediator who takes a broad approach to dispute resolution "will help the 
parties defme the scope of the problem to be addressed in the mediation, often 
encouraging them to explore underlying interests to the extent that they wish to do so." 
Riskin contrasts this approach with mediators who "accept the obvious problem 
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process in which all relevant issues--even those not originally 
contemplated-will be confronted to ensure that the settlement reached is 
workable, comprehensive, and has staying power. This approach could be of 
great service in resolving post-election process disputes. Rather than forcing 
a court to rule on countless micro-process disputes or waiting for those 
disputes to arise organically down the road, an experienced election mediator 
might anticipate problems and ensure that the full scope of the dispute-and 
possible options for resolution-are on the table. 103 Addressing the full scope 
of process issues in the early stages of a recount or contest could greatly 
enhance efficiency.104 
Finally, injecting an experienced mediator into the mix early on could 
have provided an important educative function. In reflecting on his 
experiences in the 2008 recount (and the 2010 recount),105 Minnesota 
Supreme Court Justice Paul Anderson sees the wisdom of bringing in an 
presented" and do not look to resolve any part of the dispute not immediately at the 
table.) 
103 Much of this legwork can be done in the context of a "conflict assessment" 
(sometimes referred to as a "convening assessment," in which the mediator analyzes and 
diagnose the dispute, identify stakeholders, map their interests, and assess the scope of 
the dispute. See FRANK FISHER, GERALD MILLER & MARA S. SIDNEY EDS., HANDBOOK OF 
PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS: ThEORY, POLITICS AND METHODS 515-16 (2007); see also 
Laurence Susskind & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK 
(1999). 
I04 The best argument against mediator evaluation in post-election disputes is that an 
evaluative mediator may take sides in the course of providing advice on the dispute. This 
is particularly problematic given the difficulty of finding a nonpartisan mediator. See 
infra Section II. 
The problem of impartiality in evaluative mediation is well recognized. See, e.g., 
Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of ADR and Public Civil 
Justice, 47 UCLA L. REv. 949, 1092 (2000) (noting that "bias concerns may ... be 
heightened in evaluative mediations, in which the mediator is providing an opinion on the 
merits of the parties' relative positions, precisely for the purpose of influencing the 
parties' settlements"). This concern is, however, allayed by narrowing the category of 
election dispute to be mediated to process disputes only. 
105 In November 2010, Minnesota underwent another large scale recount, this time 
between gubernatorial candidates Republican Thomas Emmer, Democrat Mark Dayton, 
and Independent Tom Homer. A close race (margin of .42%) triggered an automatic 
recount. It took just over a month to declare Dayton the winner by 8,715 votes with 99.99 
percent votes recounted and 765 ballots contested (not enough to secure victory for 
Emmer). Robert Y oon, Democrat Dayton Wins Minnesota Gov. Recount, CNN POLITICS, 
Dec. 4, 2000, http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/l2/04/democrat-dayton-wins-
minnesota-gov-recount/. 
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outsider to help educate the judiciary and state election administration about 
process decisions. He explains: 
In a recount, the deciding body is inundated by partisanship. If a neutral 
mediator could narrow the set of disputes that come before the deciding 
body by working with the parties to eliminate the outliers, the efficiency of 
the process would be greatly enhanced. 106 
Good election attorneys are always thinking two or three moves ahead. 
Adjudicatory bodies therefore are unable to get input on process matters from 
attorneys in recounts without also getting a large dollop of partisan 
maneuvering. Mediators could help educate the judiciary not about which 
side has the better argument, but about process intricacies and decisions that 
the adjudicatory body must address in order to arrive at a fair and 
comprehensive process.I07 Election attorneys will not be fans of the idea. 
Even still, reigning in the adversarial process in this context might be an 
important step forward. 
Before moving on to examine a case study, an additional mediation 
model bears mention. One of the initial process questions mediators must 
confront is whether to "co-mediate." Co-mediation refers to the common 
practice of two mediators working together as a team to mediate a dispute. 1 08 
The benefits of co-mediation are multiple. Most of the advantages of co-
mediation are practical. The co-mediation model provides another set of eyes 
and ears to help resolve a dispute. For example, while one mediator is 
talking, the other can be attentive to verbal and non-verbal cues from the 
parties. Many mediators also prefer the co-mediation model on the theory 
that two minds are better than one. When one mediator might be stuck, the 
other might have ideas about how to proceed. A final practical benefit of co-
mediation relates to strategic pairing. For example, a less experienced 
mediator might be paired with a more experienced mediator for training 
purposes. Mediators with divergent backgrounds or approaches might also be 
paired to enhance their ability to handle a complex dispute. 
106 Telephone interview with the Hon. Paul H. Anderson, Associate Justice, 
Minnesota Supreme Court (May 27, 2011). 
107 Note that any mediator interaction with the court, even if solely educative in 
purpose, should be handled thoughtfully. A structure in which a mediator is perceived as 
"reporting back" to the court may adversely impact mediator neutrality. Telephone 
Interview with Howard Bellman (August 15, 2011). 
lOS Lee A. Rosengard, Learning from Law Firms: Using Co-Mediation to Train New 
Mediators, 59 DISP. RESOL. J. 16, 18 (2004). 
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An additional benefit to co-mediation goes beyond practical advantage. 
Some mediators find that their neutrality is enhanced through the co-
mediation model. One obvious example is the use of a male mediator paired 
with a female mediator when there is gender imbalance among parties (for 
example, in a mediation between a divorcing husband and wife). The 
prospect of enhanced neutrality through co-mediation is interesting to 
contemplate in the election context, where it could prove quite useful in 
tempering concerns about partisan affiliation of mediators. Using a co-
mediation model could alleviate perceived bias or lack of political neutrality 
in a post-election dispute. Co-mediators could be appointed in a number of 
ways to enhance perceived neutrality. A court or other appointing body could 
tap two mediators generally affiliated with opposing parties in the dispute; 
for example, one mediator with a known record of supporting Democrats and 
another with a known record of supporting Republicans.I09 This 
arrangement, however, might feed fears that the mediation might become 
overly politicized. A possible solution would be to allow each party to 
choose a mediator from a list of mediators with known affiliation to the 
opposing party. This would force each party to choose the most politically 
moderate mediator it could find. 110 Although it is possible to imagine much 
fretting and handwringing about which mediators are selected, choosing a 
mediator is a much less difficult project than choosing the members of a 
tribunal or canvassing board since these bodies, unlike mediators, are called 
on to make rulings. Mediators, though they may employ evaluative 
techniques, by definition lack authority to force an outcome one way or the 
other. 
The benefits of using election mediators to resolve post-election process 
disputes are not just benefits in theory. The next section uses the 2008 
Minnesota senate race to examine whether mediation might have played a 
useful role. 
109 Note that selecting co-mediators on the basis of partisan affiliation alone would 
be a grave mistake. Indeed more important than perceived partisan affiliation should 
always be expertise in mediation, particularly co-mediators should be selected from a 
pool of mediators who are (1) respected within the mediation and election law 
communities, (2) have a solid track record successfully mediating public disputes, and (3) 
are able to work effectively with one another as mediators in terms of mediation style and 
approach. This might be a tall order at present, but the hope is that a cadre of qualified 
individuals will develop over time. Telephone Interview with Howard Bellman (August 
15, 2011). 
110 Foley, supra note 42, at 378. 
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VI. CASE STUDY: THE 2008 FRANKEN-COLEMAN RECOUNT 
There is perhaps no better recent example than the Franken-Coleman 
recount of 2008 to demonstrate the possibilities of mediation in post-election 
process disputes. First, the Franken-Coleman recount was religiously 
documented by the Minnesota Secretary of State's office, Ill the judiciary, 112 
and the state and national press, providing a bird's eye view into the 
process.ll3 Second, the process was protracted, lasting eight months from 
start to finish and featuring multiple "mini-disputes" over the course of the 
recount and subsequent contest proceedings.l14 The scale of the recount 
offers opportunities to examine which kinds of post-election disputes might 
be suited to ADR and which are not. Finally, many of the major players in 
the race are serendipitously friends of my home institution, William & Mary 
Law Schoot.l 15 With this in mind, the discussion below examines the 
Franken-Coleman recount with an eye towards whether mediation might 
have usefully been injected. Importantly, the 2008 Minnesota recount was in 
many ways sui generis, replete with local oddities and peculiar circumstances 
that would not likely surface in other post-election disputes. With this in 
mind, the discussion below examines the Franken-Coleman recount with an 
Ill See 2008 U.S. Senate Race: Recount Information, OFFICE OF TilE MINN. SEC. OF 
STATE, http://www.sos.state.mn.us/index.aspx?page=1405 (last visited Sept. 21, 2011). 
112 See Minnesota Senate Seat '08 Election, MINNESOTA JUDICIAL BRANCH, 
http://www .mncourts.gov/?page=3409 (last visited Sept. 21, 2011 ). 
113 Weiner, supra note 62, at 169-70. 
114 The initial count ended November 18. The close margin resulted in an automatic, 
mandatory hand recount. The State Canvassing Board then certified the recount results on 
January 5 at which point the Coleman campaign filed an election contest. On April 13, a 
three-judge panel resolved the contest in favor of Franken; the verdict was affmned by 
the Minnesota Supreme Court in June 2009. See STEVEN F. HUEFNER, NATHAN A. 
CEMENSKA, DANIEL P. TOKAJI & EDWARD B. FOLEY, ELECTION LAW@ MORITZ, FROM 
REGISTRATION TO RECOUNTS REVISITED 15-16 (20 11 ), available at 
http:/ /moritzlaw .osu.edu/ electionlaw/proj ects/registration-to-recounts/20 11 edition. pdf. 
For the purposes of this discussion, recount and contest will be used interchangeably. 
115 Marc Elias taught a course on Post-Election Litigation in Fall 2011 for William 
& Mary Law; Ben Ginsberg serves on William & Mary's Election Law Program 
Advisory Board and has spoken several times at the law school; Secretary of State Mark 
Ritchie recently traveled to Williamsburg to participate in the 20 II Election Law 
Symposium on the role of secretaries of state in elections; and the Hon. Justice Paul 
Anderson of the Minnesota Supreme Court and this author are members of the planning 
committee for the William & Mary Law School Privacy and Public Access to Court 
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eye towards disaggregating post-election disputes to analyze when and 
whether mediation might have been productively injected. 
A. Early Attempt to Stop Counting of Ballots 
In his engaging book on the 2008 Franken-Coleman recount, Jay Weiner 
identifies several instances when the parties rushed to court. In one early 
example, a few days before the statute-mandated manual recount, the 
discovery of thirty-two uncounted absentee ballots in Minneapolis prompted 
the Coleman team to file for a temporary restraining order to prevent these 
ballots (and, reaching for the moon, any other ballots statewide not counted 
on Election Day) from being counted.116 
At a hastily called Saturday morning hearing the day after the Coleman 
team filed its motion, Ramsey County Chief Judge Kathleen Geiran was 
extremely hesitant to issue the order, citing concerns about jurisdiction. 
Minnesota election procedure required election contests to be overseen by an 
appointed three-judge panel. 117 After bipartisan bickering and accusations 
leveled back and forth, the judge ultimately refused to enter a temporary 
restraining order or, for that matter, as the Franken side demanded, award 
$1,460 in attorney's fees. The motion denied, votes in the end were counted, 
but not after what is described as a series of press moves calculated to 
misinform.118 Instructive for these purposes, "[i]n this initial scuffle between 
116 Weiner, supra note 62, at 28. 
11 7 Judge Kathleen Gearin dismissed the matter because no party had yet filed an 
election contest lawsuit. Such a lawsuit would be filed in the Ramsey District Court, and 
would be subject to MINN. STAT. § 209.045 (2008). As prescribed by statute, the case 
would then be determined in Ramsey County by a three-judge panel appointed by the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. See Order in re: Motion for a temporary injunction 




118 Coleman's team called a press conference at which it expressed concerns about a 
later debunked report that the absentee ballots had been riding around in an election 
official's trunk, suggesting a real possibility of tampering. Weiner, supra note 62, at 29. 
Despite the election official in question confirming that the story was untrue, the story 
refused to die; (See David Brauer, Minnesota Election Director Speaks: "Ballots in My 
Car" Story False, MINNPOST.COM, Nov. 12, 2008, 
http:/ /www.minnpost.com/davidbrauer/2008/ll/12/4565/minneapolis _election_ director_ s 
peaks_ballots_in_my_car_story_false). See also Paul Schmeltzer, Fox, with Pawlenty's 
Help, Continues Spreading Car-Ballot Fiction, THE MINNESOTA INDEPENDENT, Nov.l3, 
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(the parties' attorneys]," Weiner writes, "the foundations were laid for what 
was to come." 119 
Could mediator(s) perhaps appointed at the start of the recount process, 
have resolved this dispute more effectively? This question can be answered 
affirmatively in a number of respects. First, the substance of this dispute 
could have been addressed more directly. In the litigation context, the 
question of jurisdiction was outcome-determinative, even though irrelevant 
to whether or not the votes should be counted and under what standard. 
Judge Gearin refused to issue the restraining order, not based on the merits of 
the claim, but on the grounds that she lacked jurisdiction to do so. A failure 
to receive a decision on the merits, not to mention developing standards to 
fill in the statutory gaps that would govern future similar disputes, further 
fueled the flames rather than contained them.120 With the assistance of 
skilled mediator(s) the parties might have been able to develop a set of 
standards for identifying, verifying, and counting neglected or overlooked 
ballots early on. Doing so may have precluded or at least reduced in scope 
what turned into a battle that took eight months and cost millions in legal 
fees. 
Second, mediation might have reduced nastiness. A mediated agreement 
establishing mutual interest in a fair process could have been a feather in the 
cap of both sides (and in our system of Democracy more generally). Instead, 
the public experienced yet another dose of aggressive lawyering and 
candidate posturing. 
Third, as a related point, the parties might have been better able to 
manage the press to prevent misinformation-here, confusion about the 
existence and location of the missing ballots ensued.121 Without sacrificing 
key elements of transparency (i.e., that the mediation happened, what the 
arguments were on both sides, how the parties resolved the dispute) the two 
sides might have been able to agree on a mutually beneficial set of terms by 
which to interface with the media. It would be naive to think that each side 
2008, available at http://minnesotaindependent.com/17385/recount-hannity-pawlenty-
car-ballot-lie. 
119 Weiner, supra note 53, at 30. 
120 Note that Secretary Mark Ritchie doubts whether the Franken camp wanted a 
decision on the merits at all, but rather used the incident as part of its press strategy. 
Interview with Secretary Mark Ritchie, Secretary of State, Minn. Office of the Sec. of 
State (May 25, 2011). 
121 I bore direct witness to the power of misinformation. I was sitting in at a garage 
getting my car fixed in Williamsburg, VA reading Weiner's book when a man in the 
waiting room said, "Yeah, I remember the Minnesota recount-that's the one where all 
those ballots got stashed in some lady's trunk." 
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would give up the ability to alert the press as it saw strategically fit in a 
recount process. Filing suit plays an important signaling function that 
campaigns well recognize. 122 But it could well be that a mediated agreement 
might have included language limiting efforts to manipulate the press had 
each side seen enough benefit in stemming the damage the other side might 
unleash in doing so.m 
And finally, rather than rushing to judges strategically in jurisdictions 
throughout the state (as many state election statutes require), one skilled 
mediator in charge of helping to resolve all process disputes could provide 
consistency and moral authority to push the parties towards swift resolution 
of their differences. The scattered nature of resolving post-election disputes 
was problem enough for the relatively centralized election administration in 
Minnesota. But the problem is exacerbated in states that lack a centralized 
process for resolving recount process disputes. A recent example of this 
decentralization is the 2011 Wisconsin State Supreme Court recount. The 
Wisconsin Government Accountability Board oversees recounts generally, 124 
but unlike Minnesota, where the Recount Plan 125 delineated how the process 
would unfold in the counties, process decisions not settled by statute in 
Wisconsin are made in each individual county. 126 Mediated process disputes 
could assist in states where election administration is decentralized. 
Mediators could function as statewide process experts to help counties 
manage process disputes efficiently and uniformly. 127 
122 As Secretary Mark Ritchie describes, "You always get in the newspaper when 
you go to court. Sometimes candidates in a recount file suit with no intention of finding a 
solution. It's a means of signaling." Interview with Secretary Mark Ritchie, Secretary of 
State, Minn. Office of the Sec. of State (May 25, 2011). 
123 For an interesting discussion of the role of the media in public disputes, see 
Linda L. Putnam, The Media as a Stakeholder in Framing Public Conflicts, 13 No. 4 
Disp. Resol. Mag. 12, 12 (2007). 
124 /d. 
125 See infra Part VI.B. 
126 See supra note 86 (the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board website 
confirms this characterization by noting that "Wisconsin has the most decentralized 
election administration in the United States."). The site goes on to note that Wisconsin 
state law gives each county's Board of Canvassers the primary authority to conduct 
recounts, and to decide which ballots should and should not be counted. See Statewide 
Supreme Court Recount Update, Gov. Accountability Board, May 6, 2011, 531 U.S. 98 
(2000), http://gab.wi.gov/node/1849. 
127 The problem of decentralized state election administration was driven home, of 
course, in Bush v. Gore. Since Bush v. Gore, many have argued for centralized state 
election administration to remedy this problem. See, e.g., Note, Toward a Greater State 
Role in Election Administration, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2314 (2005) (includes a 
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B. The Role of the Secretary of State's Office 
The centralized nature of Minnesota's election regime is personified in 
the secretary of state, who is designated the state's chief election officer. 128 
Secretary Mark Ritchie's role in managing the 2008 recount nicely illustrates 
a potential place for mediation in post-election disputes. In Minnesota, the 
secretary of state (an elected position) plays a key role in managing elections 
in general and recounts and contests in particular.129 The Office of Elections 
is housed within the Office ofthe Secretary of State (OSS). In Minnesota, the 
secretary of state serves as one of five members of the state Canvassing 
Board.130 During the early days of the 2008 senate recount, Minnesota 
secretary of state mediated process disputes between the campaigns (and 
other interested parties) to establish the recount process. While there are 
several important ways in which this process differed from a typical 
mediation, the similarities are instructive. 
An early example of Ritchie's mediator-like role came just after Election 
Day when the need for a recount became apparent. Secretary Ritchie reached 
comprehensive view of state modes of election administration and argues for centralized 
administration to ease efficiency and reduce partisanship); Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, 
One Person, One Vote: Protecting Access to the Franchise Through the Effective 
Administration of Election Procedures and Protections, 40 URB. LAW. 269, 273 (2008) 
(describing the role of secretaries of state as chief election administrators and argues for 
centralization). 
128 The Minnesota Constitution grants the secretary of state a central role. See MINN. 
CONST. art. VII, § 8 ("Election returns to secretary of state; board of canvassers. The 
returns of every election for officeholders elected statewide shall be made to the secretary 
of state who shall call to his assistance two or more of the judges of the supreme court 
and two disinterested judges of the district courts. They shall constitute a board of 
canvassers to canvass the returns and declare the result within three days after the 
canvass."). 
129 See MJNN. STAT. §§ 204B.l45-46 (redistricting); 204B.27 (election 
administration); 2048.47 (giving SoS authority to adopt alternative election procedures to 
permit the administration of any election affected by court orders); MINN. R. 8235 .0200 
(recounts). 
130 See MINN. STAT.§ 204C.31, subdiv. 2 ("The state canvassing board shall consist 
of the secretary of state, two judges of the supreme court and two judges of the district 
court selected by the secretary of state. None of the judges shall be a candidate at the 
election. If a judge fails to appear at the meeting of the canvassing board, the secretary of 
state shall fill the vacancy in membership by selecting another judge who is not a 
candidate at the election. Not more than two judges of the supreme court shall serve on 
the canvassing board at one time."). 
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out to the campaigns to hammer out basic procedural issues.131 He convened 
a conference call with the Director of Elections Gary Poser, an attorney from 
the Minnesota Attorney General's Office, and lawyers representing the two 
campaigns. According to Poser, the OSS circulated a document to both 
campaigns prior to the call that laid out the basic procedural rules for the 
recount (a document in final draft titled the Recount Plan).l32 The draft 
Recount Plan drew in part from procedures used in prior Minnesota recounts. 
The stated purpose of the call was to review the draft Recount Plan and 
answer any process questions or concerns the campaigns might have. 
According to Director Poser, right at the start of the call, one of the 
campaigns circulated a redlined version of the document indicating its 
desired changes. The other side had not had an opportunity to review this 
redlined document (nor had Secretary Ritchie, the Director of Elections, or 
the AG's office). Secretary Ritchie elected to give participants ten minutes to 
read through the redlined changes. According to Poser, the redlining was not 
heavy-handed. Many of the comments were small matters such as whether 
Coleman should be referred to as "Senator Coleman" or whether Franken 
should be referred to as "Mr. Franken.''133 Although some of the matters 
handled on the call were trivial, a few of the issues discussed, namely the 
issue of duplicate ballots discussed below, turned out to be quite significant. 
How closely did the conference call parallel a mediated process? 
Secretary Ritchie, holding himself out as a neutral party, convened the call to 
resolve the contours of a set of procedural issues he knew would be 
contentious between two parties passionately opposed. The call was intended 
to educate the parties about the draft Recount Plan, and also to try and work 
out any differences in advance to avoid disputes down the road. The call was 
in many ways a delicate mediated dance. As Secretary Ritchie described it, 
"we wanted to settle on process solutions that would create a balance of 
administrability, fairness, and agreement from the campaigns. We knew if 
either campaign was sufficiently dissatisfied with the result, we would end 
up in court."134 
131 Weiner, supra note 62, at 58 ("[a]fter a series of meetings and conference calls 
between both campaigns and Ritchie's office, sixteen ground rules were established for 
the recount."). 
132 The third-party candidate, Dean Barkley, was invited to participate on the call 
but chose not to. Telephone Interview with Gary Poser, Dir. of Elections, State of Minn. 
(May 26, 2011 ). 
133 Ultimately the document refers to the candidates by their last name only. A copy 
of the fmal Recount Plan available at http://www.sos.state.rnn.us/index.aspx?page=1405. 
134 Interview with Sec'y Ritchie, supra note 120. 
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Secretary Ritchie understood the need to facilitate party agreement on 
issues of concern, in large part to enhance efficiency by avoiding court 
battles. Secretary Ritchie's office knew it could not heavy-handedly dictate 
the terms of the Recount Plan. Instead, Ritchie undertook to listen to 
concerns the parties raised on the call, seek out authority where possible on 
those issues from the AG representative, generate options to resolve those 
disputes, and create a final document reflecting agreement reached. 
Ultimately, the call produced the final Recount Plan that reflected the 
concerns and interests raised.135 
Importantly, the conference call featured several characteristics not 
typical of mediation. First, the campaigns lacked the ability to define the 
terms of agreement. They could ask questions and make suggestions, but in 
the end the OSS, working with the AG's office, had the authority to dictate 
the Plan. Secretary Ritchie could take input and suggestions from the 
campaigns and rely on legal authority of the AG's office, but ultimately 
retained control over the document. 136 
A second way that the call differed was the players involved. In most 
mediations, the parties and/or their attorneys meet privately with the 
mediator(s). So long as the parties have authority to settle, most mediators do 
not want others in the room. 137 In certain kinds of mediations, particularly of 
public disputes, mediators realize the importance of having a full set of 
interests represented at the table and will refrain from mediating until all 
interested parties are present. 138 
135 According to Director Poser, the Recount Plan that the Secretary of State's 
Office submitted to the Canvassing Board represented changes and amendments 
produced as a result of campaign input during the call. Telephone Interview with Gary 
Poser, supra note 131; Recount Plan, supra note 133. 
136 The State Canvassing Board, which signed off on the document as submitted, 
retained final authority over the document, but theoretically could have made changes to 
it. Telephone Interview with Gary Poser, supra note 132 . 
. 
137 Note that some mediators prefer to mediate without lawyers in the room in 
deference to party autonomy and self-determination, and because lawyers often find the 
problem-solving orientation difficult. In at least two states, mistrust of lawyers in the 
mediation setting has culminated in statutes giving mediators the power to exclude 
lawyers from mediation sessions. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3182(a) (2009); KAN. STAT. 
ANN.§ 23-603(a)(6) (1985). For a thoughtful discussion on the benefits and drawbacks of 
lawyer representation in mediation, see Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of 
Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a 
Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON D1SP. RESOL. 269,275-331 (1999). 
13R Most mediators and court-mandated mediation programs require the presence of 
individuals on both sides with the authority to settle. In court-ordered mediation, 
accusations of bad-faith mediation can stem from failure of a party to send an individual 
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A third way the conference call differed from mediation was Secretary 
Ritchie's reliance on authoritative input. When the campaigns raised 
concerns, Secretary Ritchie would often ask the AG's counsel to provide an 
assessment of what the law dictated on the subject at issue. Likewise, 
election administrators on the call also served an "expert" function. The 
campaigns' assertions for certain changes to the process could have huge 
implications for, for example, election official staff"mg demands. The voice 
of election administrators in defining this process was therefore critical. In 
some instances, particularly in the collaborative mediation model, 139 
mediators rely on participating experts. But for the most part, traditional 
mediation excludes such input. 
A fourth way the conference call differed from traditional mediation was 
the role of the public interest. A controversial question in mediation circles is 
whether or not mediators should take the public interest into account when 
mediating.140 Many believe that mediators, particularly those mediating large 
public policy disputes, must keep the public interest in mind even when those 
interests are not necessarily represented at the table. Arguably, Secretary 
Ritchie performed this role on the call. Secretary Ritchie understood that an 
important component of the process was integrity of the system and public 
confidence. 141 With this understanding at the fore, he describes one of his 
to mediation with authority to settle. For a review of cases in which inadequate authority 
resulted in findings of bad faith, see Roger L. Carter, Oh, Ye of Little {Good] Faith: 
Questions, Concerns and Commentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in 
Mediations, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 367, 385 {2002). 
139 That said, it should be noted that in a relatively new form of ADR called 
collaborative law, collaborative practitioners commonly bring in outside experts to assist 
parties in crafting their agreement. See PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: 
ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION 111-14 (2d. 2008). 
140 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Professional Responsibility for Third-Party Neutrals, 
II ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 129, 131 (1993) {asking whether, "mediators of 
large public-policy disputes have any obligation to the public if there is no obvious 
representation of public interests in a particular dispute?); see also Carol Izumi, Implicit 
Bias and the Illusion of Mediator Neutrality, 34 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 71, 82-83 (2010) 
("For years, scholars and practitioners have questioned whether a mediator should be a 
mere facilitator of party-initiated outcomes or should assertively prevent agreements that 
are unfair or favor more powerful parties."). 
141 Jocelyn Benson, in a fascinating book about the role of secretaries of state, 
describes the various hats secretaries of state wear with regard to managing elections. In a 
chapter entitled, "The Secretary as Voter Advocate," Benson outlines the various ways 
secretaries of state advocate for the public interest: "[V]oters and sitting Secretaries must 
form a partnership of collaboration and communication. In doing so, voters are able to 
inform and bolster a Secretary's ability to voice their concerns and advocate on their 
behalf." Most of the efforts she describes include election administration reform efforts, 
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main functions on the call as representing those interests.142 The question of 
whether a secretary of state can adequately represent the public interest in a 
mediation setting raises a slew of interesting questions. First, if the secretary 
of state is an elected official, does this make him or her more or less 
responsive to the public interest? The answer is not clear. Some scholars 
have posited that legislatures are a better forum for election disputes because 
turning to a majoritarian institution resolving election disputes is better than 
asking the judicial branch to decide (i.e., a political forum for a political 
question).l43 This may arguably be true of an elected secretary of state as 
well-she or he may be quite responsive to the interests of the electorate, as 
many believe was the case with Secretary Ritchie.144 At the same time, 
examples of highly politicized secretaries of state abound--one need look no 
further than Katherine Harris during Bush v. Gore.l45 It is not at all clear that 
a state's chief election officer can be trusted to represent the public interest 
across the political spectrum. 
In the context of post-election litigation, the question of public voice can 
be a practical one. In the Franken-Coleman recount, the campaigns each 
mounted efforts to inject individual voters into the process. During the early 
phases of the recount, the Franken team methodically gathered data about 
and affidavits from voters who claimed their votes had been rejected for 
unclear reasons.146 Later at trial, a lawyer for Franken, Charlie Nauen, was 
permitted to intervene on behalf of sixty-one voters whose ballots had been 
rejected.147 For its part, the Coleman team organized an ill-fated class-action 
get-out-the-vote programs, and so forth. Benson notes that partisan politics often frustrate 
secretaries of states' efforts to advocate for voters. JOCELYN F. BENSON, STATE 
SECRETARIES OF STATE: GUARDIANS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 65 (2010). 
142 Interview with Sec'y Ritchie, supra note 120. 
143 See Huefner, supra note 24, at 321. 
144 Weiner, supra note 62, at 121. Note that Secretary Ritchie indicated that the next 
election loomed large for him during the recount as he made an effort to do his best by 
the people of Minnesota. Interview the Sec'y Ritchie, supra note 120. 
145 Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform: From Rules to Institutions, 28 
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 125, 127 (2009). 
146 Weiner, supra note 62, at 91. 
147 Weiner, supra note 62, at 173. See Petitioners' Memorandum of Law in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment, Peterson v. Ritchie, Minn. Dist. Ct., Jan. 21, 2009, 
No. A09-65, available at 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation!documents!MNElectionContest-
PetersonJ'vlemo-1-21-08.pdf (petition on behalf of the 64 voters); Order, Peterson v. 
Ritchie, Minn. Dist. Ct., Jan. 16, 2009, No. A09-65, available at 
http://www .mncourts.gov/Documents/O/Public/Other/2008%20Elections/Order .1.16.09. p 
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effort so that the interests of 11 ,000 aggrieved voters in the state would be 
represented in the litigation. 148 Despite the effort of the campaigns to 
incorporate the public interest into their narratives, it remained a partisan 
effort to do so; the problem of representation of the public's interest therefore 
persists. 
The problem of the public interest brings to light one of the most difficult 
issues in mediating public disputes: should the parties be able to define the 
contours of agreement if such agreement fails to take into account the public 
interest? An issue raised on Secretary Ritchie's conference call is illustrative 
of this point. 
C. Party Agreement and the Problem of Duplicate Ballots 
One of the biggest sticking points on the call concerned duplicates. When 
absentee ballots arrived tom or otherwise mutilated through the postal 
service, standard election administration practice guided that election 
officials would make a new ballot that could be fed into the tabulating 
machines. Original ballots were marked Original and set aside; duplicated 
ballots were marked Duplicate and also saved. The original Recount Plan 
stipulated that election officers administering the recount should count the 
duplicate ballots. But the redlined document took issue with this plan, 
advocating instead that original ballots be used in the count (on the theory 
df (order making the 64-person suit part of the pending litigation between AI Franken and 
Norm Coleman in Ramsey County). 
148 Weiner, supra note 62, at 173. Order Denying Motion for Certification of a Class 
Peterson v. Ritchie Minn. Dist. Ct., Feb. 23, 2009, No. A09-65, available at 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation!documents/Orderdenyingcertificationofacl 
ass.pdf(denying Coleman's campaign class certification to 11,000 absentee voters). The 
following are the grounds on which the court denied the class action certification: (a.) 
MINN. STAT. § 204B.44, which governs the process of seeking a remedy to an error, 
omission, or wrongful act in the election process, refers to "any individual;" it does not 
contemplate a class-action suit; (b.) MINN. STAT. § 204B.44 gives Minnesota Supreme 
Court original jurisdiction over such cases. In this case, Minnesota Rules of Civil 
Procedure would not govern (as would apply to a district court), but rather Minnesota 
Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure would apply to the Supreme Court. There is no 
mechanism for class certification under Minn. R. of Civ. App. Pro.; (c.) If Rule 23 of 
Minn. R. of Civ. Pro. did apply, Coleman's petition would nevertheless not qualify for 
class certification on the basis that it lacked commonality, typicality, and adequacy of 
representation-all requirements under Rule 23. /d. at 4, 6-7. First, the court found that 
Coleman's petition lacked commonality in that although members of the class shared a 
"common question of law," there were "unique questions of fact." !d. at 6. In addition, 
the class lacked typicality and adequacy of representation in that "Coleman cannot 
represent the class of absentee voters ... because he is not a member of that class." !d. at 7. 
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that voter intent would less likely be lost using the original ballot). When the 
opposing campaign agreed with this change, the Secretary of State's Office 
consented to what seemed a reasonable agreement among the parties. The 
final document therefore indicated the agreed upon process: 
As the Table Official sorts the ballots, he or she shall remove all ballots that 
are marked as duplicate ballots and place those duplicate ballots in a fourth 
pile. At the conclusion of the sorting process, the Table Official shall open 
the envelope of original ballots for which duplicates were made for that 
precinct and sort the original ballots in the same manner as they sorted all 
other ballots. 149 
Although the parties readily agreed to this revision on the call (without 
objection at the time from other participants, including the Secretary of 
State's Office), those administering the recount came to rue the decision. As 
election officials put this process into place, a terrible problem became 
apparent: the number of ballots marked duplicate and original did not always 
match up.l 50 
This story demonstrates a problem inherent in letting parties agree to 
process rules in an election mediation.151 Parties in an election mediation 
may agree on processes that create huge headaches for recount 
administrators, are unworkable, or worse, come at the expense of the public 
interest. What if it is problematic to allow parties too much control in 
election mediation? This very tension-when and whether to let parties agree 
to process decisions-became one of the most controversial issues in the 
2008 Minnesota recount as the next section relates. 
D. Judicial Deference to the Parties: The December 18 Order 
On December 18, 2008, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued a 
surprising and contentious opinion accompanied by two vigorous dissents. 152 
The order read, inter alia, as follows: 
149 Recount Plan, supra note 133. 
150 Weiner, supra note 62. 
15l Note the interesting overlap between the parties' ability to agree on process 
issues in mediation and recent holdings about the ability of parties to negotiate for dispute 
resolution processes in arbitration clauses. In Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattei, Inc., 552 U.S. 
576 (2008), the Supreme Court held that parties cannot agree in an arbitration clause to 
confer jurisdiction on a federal court to apply an expanded scope of review. 
152 Coleman v. Ritchie, 758 N.W.2d 306 (Minn. 2008) (Norm Coleman, a candidate 
in a disputed election, petitioned the court seeking to prevent county canvassing boards 
from counting rejected absentee ballots in the pending administrative recount). 
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Because previously rejected absentee ballots that all agree were rejected 
improperly should be counted, and in light of the fact that the State 
Canvassing Board has not yet certified the final results of the recount, we 
order candidates Norm Coleman and AI Franken and their campaign 
representative, the Secretary of State, and all county auditors and 
canvassing boards to establish and implement a process, as expeditiously as 
practicable, for the purpose of identifying all absentee ballot envelopes that 
the local election officials and the candidates agree were rejected in 
error. 153 
As Jay Weiner sums up the order, "if both campaigns ... agreed on the 
legality of an absentee ballot, it should be counted. If there's not agreement, 
that voter is screwed."l54 
The dissenting justices, Justice Alan Page and Justice Paul Anderson, 
were nothing short of enraged. Justice Page began his dissent quoting Stalin, 
who allegedly said, "I consider it completely unimportant who . . . will vote 
or how; but what is extraordinarily important is this-who will count the 
votes, and how."l55 The dissenters argued that the majority had essentially 
abdicated the public interest to an extrajudicial process . 
.At first blush, it may seem appropriate to let the political process-i.e., 
the battle between the campaigns-play out. We might feel comfortable 
deferring to the parties to duke it out, based on the assumption that at least 
one of the campaigns (the one that believes a particular voter intended to vote 
for its candidate) will be a vigorous advocate for the validity of that voter's 
ballot. But the interesting twist in this instance is that the majority did not 
leave it to the parties to battle it out with the best advocate winning; it asked 
them only to "agree" which absentee ballots were valid. Only once 
agreement was reached would a ballot count. The majority did not outline 
how agreement should be reached. It left the process question entirely in the 
hands of the parties. 
364 
Wrote Justice Page in his dissent: 
The court's order may seek the peaceful way out by asking the campaigns to 
agree on improperly rejected ballots. But the order does not guarantee that 
the candidates and their political parties will agree on any rejected ballot. 
Instead, the court's order will arbitrarily disqualify enfninchised voters on 
153 Coleman, 758 N.W.2d at 308 (emphasis added). 
154 Weiner, supra note 62, at 123. 
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the whim of the candidates and political parties without the benefit of the 
legislatively authorized procedures .... 156 
Justice Page continued, 
It is a perverse result, indeed, for political parties and their candidates to 
determine whether a voter's absentee ballot was properly or improperly 
rejected. By making the acceptance of an improperly rejected ballot 
contingent on the candidates' agreement, the court has abdicated its role as 
the defender of the fundamental right to vote.157 
The dilemma Justice Page identifies engages the problem discussed 
above. How can mediation play a role in post-election process dispute 
resolution if we are worried about delegating decisions to the parties?158 Is a 
court impermissibly delegating fundamental authority if it allows (or, in this 
case requires) the parties to resolve election process disputes? Those 
concerned about this abdication may view this as the straw that breaks the 
camel's back, invalidating mediation as a viable tool in this context 
altogether. But the problems associated with the December 18 order offer a 
perfect setting in which to examine whether a mediated solution is in fact a 
better alternative, capable of addressing the abdication concern. 
Recall the earlier disaggregation of process disputes versus outcome-
determinative disputes. What kind of dispute was at issue in the December 18 
order? Clearly, the decision to count or not count a contested absentee ballot 
is outcome determinative. But the dispute over the standard by which such 
ballots should be identified as valid or invalid is a process dispute to the core. 
In the former, a campaign would object to a single absentee ballot being 
counted, effectively retaining veto power over the franchise (the path taken). 
In the latter, the campaign would be forced to articulate its denial based on an 
agreed upon standard (the path not taken). The difference is subtle. But 
156 Coleman, 758 N.W.2d at 310 (Page, J., dissenting). 
157 Id. 
158 Interestingly, this concern has been raised in the context of the judiciary 
"abdicating" its responsibility to mediators more generally. See Nancy A. Welsh, The 
Place of Court-Connected Mediation in a Democratic Justice System, 5 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT REsoL. 117, 135 (2004) (citing Magistrate Wayne Brazil: "mediation ... [has] 
democratized the courts 'in potentially profound ways because mediation permit[s], in 
fact actively encourage[s], the parties to decide for themselves which values were most 
important to them, then to use ADR to pursue those values."'). Prof. Welsh goes on to 
identify instances in which this delegation is problematic, ultimately arguing that court-
connected mediation can only be effective and responsible if meaningful accountability 
mechanisms are put into place. !d. at 136-42. 
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looking at the words the majority order actually used, it is possible that 
recognition of this subtlety was the impulse, but was lost in translation. The 
order asked the parties to "to establish and implement a process ... for the 
purpose of identifying all absentee ballot envelopes that the local election 
officials and the candidates agree were rejected in error."159 
Perhaps the majority neglected to appreciate-but the dissents picked up 
on-the difference between counting only those ballots that the campaigns 
could agree on (engaging the outcome-determinative dispute that amounted 
to a single party veto) versus requiring the parties to agree on a process to 
determine valid ballots (calling for resolution of a process dispute). The 
outcome-determinative path is irksome because one side can so easily 
stonewall for political ends, disenfranchising voters as a strategic ploy. 
Justice Page recognized this problem in his dissent, noting that the candidates 
had no obligation to agree to any ballots, "whether reasonable or not."160 Had 
the majority opinion more clearly directed resolution of the process 
dispute-that the parties should agree upon a standard process to be applied 
uniformly to· identify valid versus invalid absentee ballots, the court's 
delegation might have been less troubling. In the end, what is worrisome is 
not the delegation of the decision to the parties, but the delegation of the 
outcome-determinative decision. 
Would a mediation of the process dispute at issue in the December 18 
order have improved matters? What would that mediated process look like? 
Suppose a mediator (or co-mediators) with substantial recount experience 
had guided the campaigns in the process of developing standards for 
identifying valid ballots. Imagine that the December 18 order had not been a 
vague instruction that the parties "agree" before any absentee ballot would be 
counted. Imagine instead that the Minnesota Supreme Court had called for a 
mediation session between the two parties to develop rules for which ballots 
would be counted and which would not in advance of examining any ballots. 
The process that unfolded under the "order to agree" involved a clear 
mismatch of legal sophistication. The Franken side had sophisticated data 
about the likely content of each of the contested ballots, and used this 
information to determine which ballots were worth a fight. During the 
session to examine contested absentee ballots following the December 18 
order, Weiner describes the following phenomenon: 
159 Coleman, 758 N.W.2d at 308 (emphasis added). 
160 Weiner, supra, note 62, at 126 (quoting Coleman, 758 N.W.2d at 311 (Page, J., 
dissenting)). 
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More than once, voting officials and Coleman reps witnessed Franken 
lawyers check with staff members-"computer geeks" . . . -who sorted 
through voter data information on their laptops. In a few cases, the staffer 
with the computer gave a thumbs-down to the Franken lawyer, and a 
decision was made.161 
Is this how democracy should function? Should parties be allowed to 
choose which votes to fight for, pitting data streams above securing the 
fundamental right to have all valid votes count? A mediated scenario could 
well have avoided this outcome by ironing out in advance standards defming 
process rules for determining which ballots would be deemed valid. Lawyers 
might have devised a strategy for identifying which kinds of irregularities 
might swing which way, or might adopt a broader tactic of trying to 
disqualify as many or as few ballots as possible. But what a mediated 
agreement before the fact would accomplish is to avoid the type of overt 
partisan ballot "selection" Weiner describes. 
There are (at least) two main criticisms of this idea. First, skeptics might 
argue that process decisions should not be delegated any more than outcome-
determinative decisions. In response to this criticism, it is not clear that the 
Minnesota Supreme Court is in a better position to have articulated the 
process standards itself. As the discussion of judicial resolution of process 
disputes in the post-election context bears out, judges may not be the best 
resource for resolving process disputes.162 
A second criticism is that in the instance of the December 18 order, the 
time for a discussion of standards had already come and gone. The Franken 
campaign was determined that each ballot "told a story," and had settled on a 
strategy that refused to lump ballots in cognizable categories. 163 This strategy 
largely precludes the idea that a mediator could have facilitated a productive 
standards discussion at this phase in the Coleman-Franken recount. In the 
case of the December 18 order, it was almost certainly too late for a 
mediation on process. However, the moral of this tale is not that mediation is 
useless in post-election litigation. Rather, it is that had an informed and broad 
process mediation taken place far earlier in the game, Minnesotans might 
have avoided this dispute devolving to the low of the December 18 Order. 
161 Weiner, supra note 62, at 133. 
162 See discussion supra. 
163 That is, other than the category that a ballot was lawfully cast and wrongfully 
rejected-the so-called fifth pile. Telephone Interview with Marc Elias, Partner, Perkins 
Coie LLP (July 12, 2011) (Elias represented Senator AI Franken in the 2008 recount 
proceedings.). 
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As these examples from the 2008 Minnesota recount bring to light, 
mediation is no panacea for resolving post-election disputes. The problems 
go far deeper than the zero-sum nature of elections running at odds with the 
promise of ADR-induced value creation. Bifurcation of post-election 
disputes into process versus outcome-determinative disputes is likewise 
complicated by the problems inherent to delegating process decisions to the 
parties in an election dispute. As the 2008 Minnesota recount beautifully 
illustrates, even what might seem to be straightforward opportunity for 
mediation in a post-election dispute must be approached cautiously and with 
full appreciation for the potential dangers of its use. Advocates of mediation 
in post-election litigation should not be too full-throated in their call. 
Likewise, those who would dismiss mediation in this context should realize 
that mediation, when approached in a thoughtful and studied manner by 
mediators with experience in the post-election dispute setting, offers the 
potential to address some of the many shortcomings of post-election 
litigation. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The question of ADR's role in public disputes has long been of 
interest.164 ADR scholars and practitioners urge that stubborn adherence to 
adversarial processes misses important opportunities for interest-based 
consensus building. Could ADR help bridge gaps in healthcare reform?165 
Help find workable consensus on difficult issues like immigration, the 
164 See Aric J. Garza, Resolving Public Policy Disputes in Texas Without Litigation: 
The Case for Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution by Governmental Entities, 31 ST. 
MARY's L.J. 987, 989 (2000) ("traditional public deliberative processes used to solve 
disputes are ripe for the introduction of institutionalized mediation as a tool to facilitate 
the remedy of these disputes."). 
165 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Scaling Up Deliberative Democracy as Dispute 
Resolution in Healthcare Reform: A Work in Progress, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 
(2011), available at www.law.duke.edu/joumals/lcp ("[p]olarization of most political 
issues ... makes gradations and variations of views and policy outcomes impossible to 
recognize and discuss because voting and other political procedures ultimately require 
binary decisions: yes or no. Although courts must usually come to win or lose binary 
solutions, true deliberation before the fact of legislation or regulation could actually 
permit more nuanced policy outcomes."). In this article, Menkel-Meadow identifies 
theoretical justification from thinkers as diverse as Adam Smith and Amartya Sen for 
"the practical 'third party neutral' or skilled deliberative democracy facilitator, mediator, 
or moderator." In the words of Adam Smith, an "impartial spectator" who can encourage 
"critical scrutiny and public discussion." !d. (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF 
MORAL SENTIMENTS (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie eds., 1976)). 
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environment, or education?1 66 Given the intractability of so many public 
disputes, it seems clear that adversarial, polarized legislative and judicial 
processes have certain shortcomings that ADR could usefully address. The 
all-too-common instances of Congressional deadlock, such as the debt-
ceiling debacle last summer167, underscore the need to re-conceptualize 
democratic dispute resolution design and consider whether even the most 
intractable public disputes might benefit from ADR' s problem-solving 
techniques. 
Election disputes fit squarely on the list of public disputes for which 
current dispute resolution mechanisms fall short. It is most certainly the case 
that litigation is best for certain post-election disputes. However, failing to 
disaggregate election disputes misses an important opportunity to increase 
the efficiency in resolving them. Ambiguities in election procedures and 
statutes that give rise to post-election disputes lead to protracted and often 
unnecessary litigation in which legal arguments can be (and are) manipulated 
to suit an overall strategic purpose instead of the broader public interest of 
seeing elections settled fairly, quickly, and with as little involvement of the 
court system as possible. This reality suggests a need to explore ADR 
methods in the post-election dispute context. With the help of informed and 
skilled election mediators, a mediated process could help resolve procedural 
and standards gaps early on before malleable legal arguments enter the fray. 
Mediation of post-election disputes warrants careful consideration in a world 
in which the adversarial process so often disserves democracy. 
166 For an interesting (though slightly dated) overview of the role in ADR in 
environmental disputes, see Rosemary O'Leary, Tracy Yandle & Tamilyn Moore, The 
State of the States in Environmental Dispute Resolution, 14 OHIO Sr. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
515, 517-610 (1999) (documenting the rise of the use of ADR techniques to resolve 
environmental disputes). 
l67 See L. Michael Hager, Government Gridlock? Try Mediation, THE HILL's 
CONGRESS BLOG (Aug. I, 2011 ), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/174815-
government-gridlock-try-mediation; David A. Hoffman, Send Mediators to Washington, 
CHRISTIA1'1 SCIENCE MONITOR (Aug. 24, 2011), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2011/0824/Send-mediators-to-
Washington. 
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